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WALK THIS WAY: DO PUBLIC SIDEWALKS
QUALIFY AS SERVICES, PROGRAMS, OR
ACTIVITIES UNDER TITLE II OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT?
Sarah Jones*
In 2005, 54.4 million people in the United States reported some degree of
disability. For many of these people—particularly the 13.5 million
Americans who use wheelchairs, canes, crutches, or walkers—the issue of
sidewalk accessibility is not merely one of convenience, but of civil rights
and public safety. Faced with public sidewalks that are impassable due to
disrepair, physical obstacles, or an absence of curb ramps, many
individuals with disabilities are forced to choose between remaining
housebound or traveling in the streets—posing a danger to both themselves
and drivers. However, as disability activists push to resolve these
shortcomings with an eye toward enhancing accessibility, cities counter by
pointing to the significant expense of upgrading thousands of miles of
sidewalk.
How to remedy the deterioration of public sidewalks has become a topic
of debate between disability advocates and cities grappling with severe
budget constraints. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.” This Note examines the circuit split
among federal courts as to whether public sidewalks are “services,
programs, or activities” within the meaning of Title II, thus providing
plaintiffs with a private right of action to force cities to ensure that public
sidewalks are accessible to the disabled. This Note argues that the
statutory text, legislative history, implementing regulations, and agency
interpretation of Title II of the ADA supports the conclusion that “services,
programs, or activities” includes public sidewalks.

* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law. Many thanks to Professor
Martha Rayner for her supervision, and my friends and family for their encouragement.
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INTRODUCTION
In November 2004, Elizabeth “Lisi” Bansen died when an SUV hit her as
she traveled in her wheelchair from the corner store to her home. 1 Bansen
was relegated to the street because the sidewalk was not wheelchair
accessible. 2 The sidewalk near Bansen’s home was cracked and “choked
with weeds,” and there was no curb ramp at the intersection where she was
killed. 3 In 2007, a jury found the city of St. Louis liable for Bansen’s death
due to the city’s “failure to maintain safe and usable sidewalks.”4 Although
the city had already spent $7.5 million to install curb ramps at ninety
percent of the city’s intersections, some areas of the city had simply
“fall[en] through the cracks.” 5
Lisi Bansen’s story is not unique. In 2006, Josefina Quinones sued the
city of Chula Vista for $10 million after her husband, James A. Quinones,
was struck and killed by a car.6 James, who used an electric wheelchair,
was traveling in the street because there was no ramp to get onto the
sidewalk. 7 In 1998, Ohio resident Kelly Dillery was charged with child
endangerment after a motorist complained about Dillery riding her
wheelchair in the street with her four-year-old daughter in her lap. 8 Dillery
argued that the sidewalks were inaccessible and eventually sued the city of
Sandusky under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 9
As these stories indicate, the accessibility of sidewalks and curbs has
become an issue of public safety for many. 10 Of the 291.1 million people in
the United Sates in 2005, 54.4 million reported some degree of disability.11
1. See Jeremy Kohler, Path of Resistance, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 11, 2005, at
A1; see also Elizabeth Pendo, Taking It to the Streets: A Public Right-of-Way Project for
Disability Law, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 901, 904–05 (2010) (discussing the Lisi Bansen story).
2. See Kohler, supra note 1, at A1.
3. See id.; see also Pendo, supra note 1, at 904.
4. Pendo, supra note 1, at 904–05.
5. Kohler, supra note 1, at A1.
6. See Tanya Mannes, Widow: Lack of Ramps Led to Husband’s Death, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., June 15, 2007, at B1.
7. See id.
8. See Wheelchair Mom Not Guilty of Putting Daughter, 5, at Risk, PLAIN DEALER
(Clev.), Mar. 12, 1999, at 1A; Disabled Mother Innocent in Ohio, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 12,
1999, at A24.
9. See Mom in Wheelchair Files Suit in Sandusky, PLAIN DEALER (Clev.), June 12,
1999, at 4B; see also RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 586 (7th ed.
2009) (noting that Dillery’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act also included
allegations that “police ‘stopped, charged and harassed’ her because of her disability” and
“made no reasonable accommodation for her” (quoting Kelly Dillery’s police report)).
10. See, e.g., Donald Shoup, Putting Cities Back on Their Feet, 136 J. URB. PLAN. &
DEV. 225, 225 (2010) (commenting that broken sidewalks “especially impede people with
disabilities”); Chris Joyner, Sidewalks Become Battlegrounds, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2009, at
3A (discussing the “potentially dangerous practice” of disabled individuals across the
country using their wheelchairs to travel in the streets due to sidewalk disrepair).
11. MATTHEW W. BRAULT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POP. REP. P70-117,
AMERICANS
WITH
DISABILITIES:
2005,
at
4
(2008),
available
at
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In addition to the 13.5 million Americans who use wheelchairs, canes,
crutches, or walkers, 7.8 million people reported some level of visual
impairment, including 1.8 million who are completely blind. 12
However, as disability rights advocates push for cities to comply with the
standards of the ADA, 13 cities note that the classification of sidewalks as
“services” has significant fiscal consequences.14 Under Title II of the
ADA, public entities are obligated to bring their “services, programs, and
activities” into compliance with ADA regulations regarding accessibility.15
Cities argue that designating sidewalks as “services” ignores the financial
limitations on public entities given the “phenomenal[] expens[e]” of
bringing thousands of miles of sidewalk into compliance with the ADA.16
How to best handle the deterioration of our nation’s sidewalks has become
a point of contention between disability rights advocates and municipalities
facing severe budget constraints. 17
Title II of the ADA forbids disability discrimination by government
entities by providing that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”18 While the statute defines
both “public entity” and “disability,” Title II does not explicitly define what
constitutes a “service, program, or activity.” 19 This Note examines the
extent to which plaintiffs have a private right of action under Title II to
force a city to maintain public curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots in
compliance with the ADA. Specifically, this Note addresses whether public

http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p70-117.pdf (based on data collected from a Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) conducted in 2005). The SIPP concerned only
the civilian non-institutionalized population of the United States, and consequently did not
include the disability statuses of individuals living in institutional group facilities, such as
nursing homes. Id. at 3–4. Statistician Matthew Brault notes that had institutionalized
persons been included in the population universe, “estimates of disability prevalence may
have been higher.” Id. at 3.
12. See Pendo, supra note 1, at 904 (citing BRAULT, supra note 11, at 6).
13. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).
14. See Stephanie Francis Cahill, Where the Sidewalk Ends: Court Rules Sidewalks
Must Be Accessible Under the ADA, A.B.A. J. E-REP. (A.B.A., Chicago, Ill.), June 28, 2002,
at 9 (discussing the position of the National League of Cities, that “financial straits prohibit”
cities from making sidewalks completely accessible, and that the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit’s decision recognizing sidewalks as “services” under Title II “ignores the
limitations on public entities” (internal quotations omitted)); see also Joyner, supra note 10,
at 3A (reporting that “cash-strapped cities and disability-rights advocates [are] at odds” over
how to deal with the problem of inaccessible sidewalks).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, 12134 (2006); see 28 C.F.R. § 35.149 (2010 and Mar. 15, 2011
amendments).
16. Cahill, supra note 14, at 9.
17. See id.; see also Joyner, supra note 10, at 3A.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
19. Id. § 12131; see Frame v. City of Arlington, 616 F.3d 476, 485 (5th Cir. 2010), reh’g
en banc granted, No. 08-10630, 2011 WL 242385, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 26, 2011); Barden v.
City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002).
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sidewalks can be considered “services, programs, or activities” within the
meaning of Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.20
Part I of this Note explains the civil rights model of disability law,
discusses the provisions and court interpretations of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA, and, finally, addresses the tools
of statutory interpretation. Part II details the recent circuit split among the
federal courts regarding whether public sidewalks, curbs, and parking lots
qualify as “services, programs, or activities” under Title II of the ADA. At
stake in this conflict of statutory interpretation is whether an individual may
bring a private action against a public entity when public sidewalks do not
meet the accessibility requirements of the ADA regulations. Finally, Part
III argues that though sidewalks themselves may be “facilities,” the
provision and maintenance of a public sidewalk system is a government
service within the meaning of Title II.
I. DISABILITY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: NONDISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC
SERVICES UNDER SECTION 504 AND TITLE II OF THE ADA
A. The Shift from the Integrationist Model of Disability to the Civil Rights
Model
Disability law, and the relationship between disability and the law, has
changed as society’s understanding of disability has developed over time.21
In the 1960s, disability rights activist Jacobus tenBroek detailed a shift in
the disability law paradigm from “custodialism” to “integrationism.”22
Professor tenBroek maintained that laws relating to the handicapped
originally developed on a theory of custodialism—a medically oriented
model of disability that emphasized the physical differences of persons with
disabilities and the need to cure, or separate and protect, these individuals.23
Professor tenBroek contrasted the custodial model with the newer
integrative approach, which is based on a civil rights conception of
disability. 24 Proponents of the integrative model disregarded isolation and
protection, instead focusing on achieving equality, access, and full

20. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 701–795n (2006)).
21. See MARK C. WEBER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY LAW 1 (2007); see also H.R. REP.
NO. 101-485(III), at 25–27 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 447–49.
22. Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 809, 816 (1966); see WEBER, supra note 21, at 1.
23. tenBroek & Matson, supra note 22, at 815–16; see WEBER, supra note 21, at 1.
Custodialism is a “societal approach[] to disability” that reflects itself in “‘policies of
segregation and shelter, of special treatment and separate institutions.’” Robert L. Burgdorf,
Jr., Restoring the ADA and Beyond: Disability in the 21st Century, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R.
241, 247–48 (2008) (quoting tenBroek & Matson, supra note 22, at 816).
24. See tenBroek & Matson, supra note 22, at 816; see also Burgdorf, supra note 23, at
265 (explaining that the civil rights model of disability “views the limitations that arise from
disabilities as largely the result of prejudice and discrimination” rather than simply the
“inevitable result” of an individual’s physical or mental impairments).
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participation in society for individuals with disabilities. 25 Recognizing that
the social handicap experienced by disabled persons often outweighs the
actual physical restrictions of their impairments,26 civil rights advocates
worked to remove these attitudinal barriers to social equality and economic
opportunity. 27
B. The Disability Rights Movement: “You Gave Us Your Dimes, Now We
Want Our Rights” 28
The shift to a civil rights model of disability ushered in the disability
rights movement. 29 Emboldened by the efforts of other minority groups in
the 1960s and 1970s to achieve equality, disability activists used tactics
such as marches, protests, acts of civil disobedience, and litigation to
advocate for change.30
In the 1970s and 1980s, Congress passed a number of federal laws
prohibiting disability-based discrimination, including the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 31 the Voting Accessibility for the
Elderly and Handicapped Act, 32 the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 33 and
25. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,
426–27 (1991) (explaining that under the civil rights model of disability, disabled persons
are considered “equal citizens” who do not need charity, but rather the opportunity to
“participate fully in society”); tenBroek & Matson, supra note 22, at 816, 840; see also
Burgdorf, supra note 23, at 249. Professor Robert L. Burgdorf characterizes Professor
tenBroek’s approach as an argument that a national policy of integrationism should control
because “people with disabilities have a constitutional and legal right to live in the world, to
freedom of movement within that world, and to equal access to places of public
accommodation; and that artificial barriers that keep such individuals from moving about
throughout society are or should be illegal.” Burgdorf, supra note 23, at 250 (citing Jacobus
tenBroek, The Right To Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CALIF. L.
REV. 841, 848–52, 910–18 (1966)).
26. See tenBroek & Matson, supra note 22, at 814–16; see also tenBroek, supra note 25,
at 842 (arguing that the “actual physical limitations resulting from the disability more often
than not play little role in determining whether the physically disabled are allowed to move
about and be in public places”).
27. See WEBER, supra note 21, at 1.
28. This slogan was used by activists during the disability rights movement. See
Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 426 (citing Terri Schultz, The Handicapped, a Minority
Demanding Its Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1977, at E8).
29. See Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 426–28; see also Burgdorf, supra note 23, at 247–48
(noting that tenBroek’s theory of an integrationist approach to disability was “the conceptual
foundation for the systematic use” of court actions challenging disability discrimination
which “ultimately culminat[ed] in what we have come to call a Disability Rights
Movement”).
30. See Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 427–28; see also Schultz, supra note 28, at E8
(reporting that “thousands of the disabled are picketing, filing suits and lobbying for the
equal protection promised but never received”).
31. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, tit. VI, 84 Stat.
175–88 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006)) (providing federal special
education funding to states that guarantee children with disabilities a free, appropriate public
education).
32. Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 98-435, 98
Stat. 1678 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973ee (2006)) (providing for accessible polling
stations and nondiscrimination policies).
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the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988. 34 However, the broadest and
“most important” federal statute was section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, 35 which prohibits discrimination based on disability in programs
receiving federal financial assistance. 36
C. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Rehabilitation Act of 197337 was one of the first comprehensive
federal laws enacted to benefit individuals with disabilities.38 Sections 501
and 503 focus on employment, and prohibit disability discrimination by
federal agencies and federal contractors, respectively. 39 Section 502
establishes the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance
Board, charged with enforcing the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, while
section 504 prohibits disability discrimination in any program or activity
receiving federal funding. 40
1. Section 504: Provisions
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that “[n]o otherwise
qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.” 41 The phrase “program or activity” is defined
33. Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080 (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 41705 (2006)) (forbidding disability discrimination in commercial air
transportation and establishing accessibility requirements).
34. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3614 (2006)) (prohibiting disability discrimination in
housing).
35. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 701–795n (2006)).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 794; Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 428; see also LAURA ROTHSTEIN &
JULIA ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW § 1:2, at 5 (4th ed. 2009) (deeming Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act the “most significant federal protection for individuals with
disabilities” prior to the Americans with Disabilities Act).
37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–795n.
38. See id.; see also ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 1:17, at 53.
39. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793; see also ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 1:17,
at 54. Under sections 501 and 503, federal agencies and contractors are not only prohibited
from discriminating on the basis of disability, but are also required to use affirmative action
programs to employ qualified individuals with disabilities. See COLKER, supra note 9, at 32.
40. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 792, 794; see also COLKER, supra note 9, at 32.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (prohibiting disability discrimination by the United States Postal
Service as well). The nondiscrimination principle embodied by Section 504 was initially
proposed as an amendment to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295–96 n.13 (1985); H.R. 14033, 92d Cong., 118 CONG. REC. 9,712
(1972); S. 3044, 92d Cong., 118 CONG. REC. 525–26 (1972);. See generally Civil Rights Act
of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (“No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.”). After the amendment did not pass, Section 504 was added to the
proposed Rehabilitation Act at the end of the legislative session—passing without debate.
See COLKER, supra note 9, at 32.
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as “all the operations” of a qualifying state or local government entity,42
where any part of the entity is receiving federal funding. 43
Section 504 was originally implemented through regulations promulgated
by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).44 The
responsibility for issuing regulations to enforce section 504 was eventually
transferred to the Department of Justice (DOJ). 45 Additionally, the head of
any federal department or agency that extends federal financial assistance,
as well as the United States Postal Service, is required to issue regulations
“as may be necessary” to implement the provisions of section 504.46 These
regulations must be consistent with DOJ regulations. 47
Section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that the remedies of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 are available to persons protected by section
504. 48 The remedies available to plaintiffs in the event of a section 504
violation include: the termination of federal funding, injunctive relief,
damages, and attorney’s fees. 49
42. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1).
43. Id. § 794(b); see also 1 Americans with Disabilities: Practice and Compliance
Manual (West) § 1:88 (Apr. 2010). The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 amended
Section 504 to state that where a part of a program or activity receives federal funding, the
entire program is subject to the nondiscrimination requirements of Section 504. See Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(B) (noting
that Section 504 applies to state or local government entities that distribute federal funding
“and each such department or agency (and each other State or local government entity) to
which the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local government”);
see also ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 1:20, at 60.
44. See Exec. Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (Apr. 28, 1976); see also
ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 1:2, at 6 (discussing Executive Order 11,914, in
which President Gerald Ford mandated that the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW) promulgate regulations under Section 504 in response to public displeasure
over the lack of enforcement). In 1980, HEW became the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS). Id. § 1:2, at 7. Executive Order No. 11,914 was later revoked by Executive
Order No. 12,250, in which President Jimmy Carter mandated that the Attorney General
“coordinate the implementation and enforcement of” the nondiscrimination provisions of
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (Nov. 2,
1980).
45. See ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 1:2, at 7.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); see also ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 1:2, at 7
n.29 (“Each federal agency and department granting federal financial assistance is to
promulgate its own regulations using the Department of Justice regulations as a guideline.”).
47. See 1 Americans with Disabilities: Practice and Compliance Manual, supra note 43,
§ 1:3.
48. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). Section 505 was added to the Rehabilitation Act by
amendment in 1978. See Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental
Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 120(a), 92 Stat. 2955, 2982; see
also ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36, § 1:2, at 7. Though Title VI does not
explicitly provide a private right of action, the U.S. Supreme Court has found “an implied
right of action” and concluded that private individuals “‘may sue to enforce Title VI,’” and
therefore have a private right of action under Section 504 and Title II. Barnes v. Gorman,
536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001))
(holding that plaintiffs may seek compensatory, but not punitive, damages under Section 504
and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)); see also infra notes 111–12.
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a; 1 Americans with Disabilities: Practice and Compliance
Manual, supra note 43, §§ 1:250–58; see also ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 36,
§ 1:21–22, at 65–67. Termination of federal funds is limited to the specific program or part
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2. Regulations Implementing Section 504
Under the DOJ’s regulations that implement section 504, entities
receiving federal financial assistance must ensure that “no qualified
handicapped person is denied the benefits of, excluded from participation
in, or otherwise subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
. . . because the recipient’s facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by
handicapped persons.” 50 Any federally funded program or activity must,
when “viewed in its entirety,” be “readily accessible to and usable by”
persons with disabilities. 51
However, while alterations to existing facilities must be accessible “to
the maximum extent feasible,” 52 all existing facilities need not be readily
accessible to comply with section 504.53 In choosing compliance methods
for existing facilities, entities are required to “give priority to those methods
that serve handicapped persons in the most integrated setting
appropriate.” 54 Additionally, though the statute does not expressly outline
an undue burden standard, courts have interpreted section 504 not to require
recipients of federal funds to take any action that would constitute an undue
burden or fundamentally alter the nature of the program or activity in
question. 55
3. Scope of Section 504
The scope of section 504 is limited in that it only covers entities that
receive federal financial assistance.56 Additionally, the plain language of
of a program that was found to violate Section 504. See ROTHSTEIN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note
36, § 1:21, at 65. In an action brought under Section 504, compensatory damages are
available only upon a showing of discriminatory intent or deliberate indifference. See, e.g.,
Ferguson v. City of Phx., 157 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 1998); Wood v. President & Trs. of
Spring Hill Coll., 978 F.2d 1214, 1219 (11th Cir. 1992); see also 1 Americans with
Disabilities: Practice and Compliance Manual, supra note 43, § 1:252.
50. 28 C.F.R. § 42.520 (2010).
51. Id. § 42.521(a); see also Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and
Local Government: The Relationship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1089, 1099 (1995)
(explaining that in recognition of “the cost-effectiveness of accessible design,” the
regulations subject new facilities to stricter requirements than existing facilities).
52. 28 C.F.R. § 42.522(a).
53. Id. § 42.521(a)–(b) (providing that recipients of federal financial assistance are “not
required to make structural changes in existing facilities where other methods are effective in
achieving compliance”); see also Weber, supra note 51, at 1099.
54. 28 C.F.R. § 42.521(b); see also Weber, supra note 51, at 1099.
55. See Weber, supra note 51, at 1103 (citing Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
410, 414 (1979) (holding that the college’s “reasonable physical qualifications for admission
to a clinical training program” did not violate Section 504, as “fundamental alteration[s] in
the nature of a program” are beyond the sort of reasonable modification required by Section
504)).
56. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006); Weber, supra note 51, at
1110; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
366 (noting that Section 504 “prohibits discrimination only by recipients of [f]ederal
financial assistance”); Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 429 (commenting that under Section 504
and other pre-ADA nondiscrimination laws, “almost all activities and programs not funded
by the federal government could freely discriminate on the basis of disability”).
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the statute prohibits only discrimination “solely by reason” of disability,
opening the door for narrow judicial interpretation of the statute.57
However, in Alexander v. Choate 58 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
argument that “proof of discriminatory animus” is required to establish a
cognizable claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and its
implementing regulations.59 Examining the legislative history of section
504, the Court reasoned that Congress had perceived disability
discrimination to most often be the result, not of intentional discrimination,
“but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect,” and
pointed out that federal agencies have concluded that discrimination against
disabled individuals “is primarily the result of apathetic attitudes.”60
Nevertheless, though the Court “assume[d] without deciding” that some
disparate impact claims would be viable under section 504, it rejected the
“boundless notion” that any showing of disparate impact would prove a
prima facie section 504 claim. 61 Mindful of “the desire to keep § 504
within manageable bounds,” the Court upheld a Medicaid plan that limited
the annual number of hospitalization days covered by Medicaid, despite the
fact that the plan had a greater negative impact on persons with
disabilities. 62
D. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
As the limitations of section 504 and other nondiscrimination statutes
became apparent, disability rights activists began a push to amend civil
rights statutes. 63 In the mid-1980s, advocates attempted to amend the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to include individuals with disabilities.64 After those

57. See Weber, supra note 51, at 1110–11 & n.126 (discussing Cushing v. Moore, 783 F.
Supp. 727, 734 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d in part and remanded in part, 970 F.2d 1103 (2d Cir.
1992), in which the court, emphasizing the statutory phrase “solely by reason of,” found no
cause of action to be available to the plaintiff, who alleged he was denied self-medication
privileges in a public health program because he was disabled and unemployed).
58. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
59. Id. at 292–99; see also COLKER, supra note 9, at 555.
60. Choate, 469 U.S. at 295–96. The Court further argued that it would “be difficult if
not impossible” to effect much of the behavior Congress sought to change if the
Rehabilitation Act was read to only prohibit intentional discrimination. Id. at 296–97 (noting
that the elimination of architectural barriers was a “central aim[] of the [Rehabilitation] Act,”
yet most were not erected purposely to exclude persons with disabilities (citing S. REP. NO.
93-318, at 4 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, 2079)).
61. Id. at 298–99; see also WEBER, supra note 21, at 168 (commenting that the Court
thought that requiring recipients of federal funds to assess every proposed action’s effect on
the disabled would “be unwieldy and contrary to congressional intent”).
62. Choate, 469 U.S. at 289–99.
63. See Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 430–31 (“Experience with the application of . . .
prior statutes, including section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, uncovered or
highlighted weaknesses of such laws arising from their statutory language, the limited extent
of their coverage, inadequate enforcement mechanisms, and erratic judicial interpretations.”
(citations omitted)).
64. See, e.g., H.R. 370, 99th Cong., H.R. 370, 99th Cong., 131 CONG. REC. 454 (1985)
(statement of Rep. John Joseph Moakley); see also Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 429.
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efforts proved unsuccessful, advocates proposed a comprehensive federal
statute prohibiting disability discrimination. 65
1. General Provisions: Overview, Findings, and Purposes
The ADA was enacted pursuant to Congress’s powers under the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 66 The
overarching purpose of the ADA is “[t]o provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities.” 67 Additionally, the framers of the ADA sought to
establish “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards” addressing
disability discrimination, and “to ensure that the Federal government plays
a central role” in enforcing those standards.68
Congress noted that at the time, forty-three million Americans had
physical or mental impairments, and that the number would only increase as
the population aged. 69 Congress reported that persons with disabilities had
been historically isolated by society, and that disability discrimination
“continue[d] to be a serious and pervasive social problem.” 70 Congress
outlined various forms of such discrimination—including “outright
intentional exclusion,” architectural barriers, and “failure to make
modifications to existing . . . practices.”71 Congress went on to note that
unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination based on “race,
color, sex, national origin, religion, or age,” people with disabilities had
often been without legal recourse to address discrimination against them.72
Congress concluded that persons with disabilities constituted a “discrete
and insular minority” 73 and outlined the goals of achieving “equality of

65. See H.R. 4498, 100th Cong., 134 CONG. REC. 9604-08 (1988) (statement of Rep.
Silvo O. Conte); S. 2345, 100th Cong., 134 CONG. REC. 9379-82 (1988); see also Burgdorf,
supra note 25, at 432.
66. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2006)
(stating that one purpose of the ADA was “to invoke the sweep of congressional authority,
including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order
to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities”).
See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
. . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
68. Id. § 12101(b)(2)–(3).
69. Id. § 12101(a)(1); see also Pendo, supra note 1, at 904 (noting that “the number and
percentage of people with . . . disabilities are expected to rise as the population ages” (citing
BRAULT, supra note 11, at 4 (“As age increases so does the prevalence of disability.”))).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2); see also Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 435–36.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5); see also Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 435.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4); see also Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 435.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7); see also Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 436 (arguing that this
finding serves as “a Congressional endorsement” of the idea that disability is a “suspect”
classification subject to “heightened judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause”).
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opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic selfsufficiency” for individuals with disabilities.”74
2. Judicial Interpretation
The five titles of the ADA prohibit discrimination on the basis of
disability in a number of different contexts, including employment, the
provision of public services, places of public accommodation, and
communication services.75 Under the ADA, “disability” is defined as:
“(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”76
Between 1999 and 2002, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases that
narrowly interpreted the definition of disability under the “actually
disabled” prong, further limiting the scope of protection provided by the
ADA. 77
In three cases decided on June 22, 1999, the Court ruled that mitigating
measures must be taken into account when determining whether a person is
disabled under the ADA. 78 In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 79 the lead
case of the so-called “Sutton trilogy,” the plaintiffs argued that that they had
been discriminated against on the basis of their disability because, although
their corrected vision met United Airline’s 20/100 standard for
employment, United rejected them because of their uncorrected vision.80
The Court held that mitigating measures, such as glasses, “must be taken
into account when judging whether [a] person is ‘substantially limited’ in a
major life activity and thus ‘disabled’ under the Act,” and concluded that
the plaintiffs were not “actually disabled” because their corrected vision
was 20/20. 81 The Court reiterated this holding in the other Sutton trilogy

74. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8); see also Burgdorf, supra note 25, at 437 (reasoning that
Congress’s inclusion of this finding establishes these four goals as “guiding stars to
illuminate the interpretation of the Act’s provisions”).
75. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17, 12131–34, 12181–89, 12201–13; 47 U.S.C. § 225; see
also John C. Coleman, III & Marcel L. Debruge, A Practitioner’s Introduction to ADA Title
II, 45 ALA. L. REV. 55, 56 (1993); WEBER, supra note 21, at 5.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); see also Elizabeth A. Pendo, Substantially Limited Justice?:
The Possibilities and Limits of a New Rawlsian Analysis of Disability-Based Discrimination,
77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 225, 230 (2003). This definition provides individuals with three
methods of demonstrating they are covered by the ADA. Individuals with a current physical
or mental disability fall within the first prong, and are deemed “actually impaired.” See
WEBER, supra note 21, at 25.
77. Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1, 34 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. See Burgdorf, supra note 23, at 258–62.
79. 527 U.S. 471 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553; see infra Part I.F.
80. 527 U.S. at 476. The twin sister plaintiffs’ vision was 20/20 if they wore eyeglasses
or contact lenses. Id. at 475. Uncorrected, the plaintiffs’ vision was 20/200 in one eye and
20/400 in the other eye. Id.
81. Id. at 482, 488–89.
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cases: Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg 82 and Murphy v. United Parcel
Service, Inc. 83
In 2002 the Supreme Court further limited the ADA’s scope by narrowly
interpreting the meaning of “major life activity.”84 In Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 85 the Supreme Court held that a
“major life activity” is one that involves the ability to perform the
fundamental tasks essential to most people’s daily lives, not merely a task
required by an individual’s specific job.86 The Court reasoned that the
terms of the ADA “need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding
standard for qualifying as disabled.” 87
E. Title II: Public Services
Title II, the “public services” provision of the ADA, prohibits
discrimination by public entities.88 Title II overlaps substantially with
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, but expands Section 504’s
obligations to cover governmental entities not receiving federal funding.89

82. 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999) (holding that the Ninth Circuit erred by failing to take
mitigating measures into account in determining whether plaintiff, who had 20/200 vision in
his left eye and monocular vision, was disabled because plaintiff’s “brain ha[d] developed
subconscious mechanisms for coping with [his] visual impairment,” and the Court saw “no
principled basis for distinguishing between measures undertaken with artificial aids, like
medications and devices, and measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the
body’s own systems” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
83. 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (holding that a mechanic fired because of his high blood
pressure did not meet the ADA definition of “disabled” because “when medicated, [his] high
blood pressure [did] not substantially limit him in any major life activity”), superseded by
statute, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553; see infra Part I.F.
84. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200–01 (2002),
superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; see also Colker, supra note 77,
at 61 (“[R]ecent decisions suggest that [the Supreme Court] is further constricting the scope
of the ADA . . . most evident in the Court’s 2002 decision in Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.”).
85. 534 U.S. 184 (2002), superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553;
see infra Part I.F.
86. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 197–202. The Court reversed the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s finding that the plaintiff was disabled because it
inappropriately considered the plaintiff’s inability to do manual work in her specific
occupation, due to carpal tunnel syndrome and tendonitis, as “sufficient proof that she was
substantially limited in performing manual tasks” and disregarded the plaintiff’s ability to do
household tasks such as brushing her teeth and bathing. Id. at 201–02.
87. Id. at 197.
88. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 201–04, 42 U.S.C. § 12131–34
(2006); see also Coleman & Debruge, supra note 75, at 56.
89. See Coleman & Debruge, supra note 75, at 57; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a)
(“Except as otherwise provided . . . nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a
lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29
U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.”);
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631–32 (1998) (stating that § 12201(a) “requires [the
Court] to construe the ADA to grant at least as much protection as provided by the
regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act”). The legislative history of Title II
explains that Congress intended that Title II “simply extend[] the anti-discrimination
prohibition embodied in section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] to all actions of state and
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Thus, government entities receiving federal financial assistance, i.e., most
branches of state and local government, are governed by both Title II and
Section 504. 90
1. Provisions
The legislative history of Title II provides that Congress enacted Title II
with the intent of “break[ing] down barriers to the integrative participation
of people with disabilities in all aspects of community life.” 91 Title II’s
general discrimination prohibition provides that “no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.” 92 The term “public entity” includes any state or local government93
and their departments, agencies, special purpose districts, or other
instrumentalities.94
2. Regulations Implementing Title II
The Attorney General is required to promulgate regulations to enforce the
provisions of Title II. 95 The regulations give effect to the Title II
requirement that, “no qualified individual with a disability . . . be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.” 96

local governments.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367.
90. See WEBER, supra note 21, at 163. Additionally, because the ADA was modeled
after the Rehabilitation Act, and Title II expressly provides that the remedies available under
Section 504 also apply to Title II, courts have held that jurisprudence interpreting either
Section 504 or Title II is applicable to both. See, e.g., Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799
(5th Cir. 2000).
91. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(III), at 49–50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
472–73; see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523–25 (2004) (finding that Title II
constituted a valid exercise of Congress’s enforcement power because Title II was passed
against a backdrop of “pervasive” state discrimination in the allocation of public services
against persons with disabilities, as documented in the legislative history of Title II, Supreme
Court cases, state laws, and the decisions of other courts).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see also Coleman & Debruge, supra note 75, at 57.
93. Title II covers only state and local governments, not the federal government. See 42
U.S.C. § 12131(1). Programs conducted by any executive agency or the United States Postal
Service fall under the purview of Section 504. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); see also COLKER,
supra note 9, at 508.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1); see also Coleman & Debruge, supra note 75, at 57. A
“qualified individual with a disability” is defined as a person with a disability who, “with or
without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural,
communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services,
meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in
programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C § 12131(2); see also Coleman
& Debruge, supra note 75, at 57.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
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To comply with the ADA, public entities must operate such that each
program, service, or activity, “when viewed in its entirety,” is accessible to
individuals with disabilities. 97 The DOJ regulations explicitly prohibit
public entities from excluding the disabled from services because of
inaccessible or unusable facilities. 98 A “facility” is defined as “all or any
portion of buildings, structures, sites, complexes, equipment, rolling stock
or other conveyances, roads, walks, passageways, parking lots, or other real
or personal property, including the site where the building, property,
structure, or equipment is located.” 99 New facilities constructed after
January 26, 1992 must be “readily accessible to and usable by individuals
with disabilities.” 100 Any alteration of a facility that “could affect the
usability of the facility or part of the facility” must be readily accessible to
the “maximum extent feasible.”101
Existing facilities are subject to a program access standard, meaning that
public entities are not “necessarily require[d]” to make every existing
facility accessible, as long as the entity’s programs, services, or activities
are accessible “when viewed in [their] entirety.” 102 A public entity does not
have to make structural changes to existing facilities if the entity can
achieve compliance through other methods. 103 Additionally, public entities
are not required to make existing facilities accessible where doing so
“would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service,
program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens.” 104
97. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a) (2010 and Mar. 15, 2011 amendments); see also Coleman &
Debruge, supra note 75, at 87 (noting that the Title II regulations “focus first and foremost
on access to the program or service, not access to the facility”).
98. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.149 (“Except as otherwise provided . . . no qualified individual
with a disability shall, because a public entity’s facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by
individuals with disabilities, be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity . . . .”); see also John W. Parry, State &
Local Government Services Under the ADA: Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability,
15 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 615, 618 (1991) (noting that “[p]rogram
inaccessibility constitutes illegal discrimination”).
99. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104.
100. Id. § 35.151(a); see also Coleman & Debruge, supra note 75, at 89.
101. 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(b); see also Coleman & Debruge, supra note 75, at 89.
102. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., DISABILITY
RIGHTS SECTION, THE AMS. WITH DISABILITIES ACT TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL, § II-5.1000 (1993). The DOJ’s Interpretive Guidance for ADA Title II notes that
Title II requires existing facilities to comply with a program access standard “because the
cost of retrofitting existing facilities is often prohibitive.” 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.150.
103. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(b)(1); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 102, § II5.2000 (“A public entity must make its ‘programs’ accessible. Physical changes to a
building are required only when there is no other feasible way to make the program
accessible.”).
104. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3); see also id. pt. 35, app. A, § 35.150 (cautioning that
“Congress intended the ‘undue burden’ standard in Title II to be significantly higher than the
‘readily achievable’ standard in Title III” and stating that Title II’s program access
requirement “should enable individuals with disabilities to participate in and benefit from the
services, programs, or activities of public entities in all but the most unusual cases”). In the
House Report on the ADA, Congress acknowledged that the requirement of program access
in existing facilities is subject to an undue burden standard. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(III), at 50
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 473. However, Congress also praised the
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When a public entity with fifty or more employees decides to structurally
modify existing facilities to achieve accessibility, the entity must develop a
transition plan “identify[ing] physical obstacles in facilities that limit the
accessibility of [government] programs or activities,” and outline a process
for making those facilities accessible to the disabled. 105 A public entity that
has authority over streets, roads, or walkways must include in its transition
plan a schedule for providing curb cuts, “giving priority to walkways
serving entities covered by the Act, including State and local government
offices and facilities, transportation, places of public accommodation, and
employers, followed by walkways serving other areas.” 106
Finally, any “[n]ewly constructed or altered streets, roads, and highways
must contain curb ramps or other sloped areas” at intersections featuring
curbs or other such barriers to sidewalk access. 107 Newly constructed or
altered sidewalks must feature curb ramps at intersections as well. 108
3. Enforcement of Title II and Remedies for a Violation Thereof
The requirements of Title II are enforced through the “remedies,
procedures, and rights set for forth in Section 794a of title 29 [section 505
of the Rehabilitation Act].” 109 As discussed in Part I.C.1, section 505
incorporates the remedies, procedures, and rights available under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 110
In Barnes v. Gorman, 111 the Supreme Court recognized that individuals
have a private cause of action to enforce both Section 504 and Title II.112
The Court explained that its prior decisions had recognized an “implied
[private] right of action” to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and that the remedies available for claims under Section 504 and Title II are
“coextensive with the remedies . . . brought under Title VI.” 113 However,

“long-range” societal benefits of the integration of people with disabilities despite the “shortterm” yet “substantial” financial and administrative burdens. Id.
105. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(d).
106. Id. § 35.150(d)(2).
107. Id. § 35.151(e)(1) (to be codified at section 35.151(i)(1) after Mar. 15, 2011
amendments to the Title II regulations); see also Kinney v. Yerusalim, 9 F.3d 1067, 1075
(3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the “resurfacing of the city streets is an alteration within the
meaning of 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(b) which must be accompanied by the installation of curb
cuts under 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(e)”).
108. 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(e)(2) (to be codified at section 35.151(i)(2) after Mar. 15, 2011
amendments). The legislative history of the ADA reveals that Congress explicitly
recognized the importance of mandating curb cuts under Title II, stating that “[t]he
employment, transportation, and public accommodation sections of this Act would be
meaningless if people who use wheelchairs were not afforded the opportunity to travel on
and between the streets.” See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(II), at 84, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2006).
110. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a (2006); see also supra note 48 and accompanying text.
111. 536 U.S. 181 (2002).
112. See id. at 184–85.
113. Id. at 185; see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 279–80 (2001) (“[I]t is clear
from our decisions [and] from Congress’s amendments of Title VI [that] private individuals
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exactly what government conduct gives rise to a private cause of action
under Title II has been the subject of debate. 114
In Alexander v. Sandoval 115 the Supreme Court held that individuals do
not have a private cause of action to enforce disparate impact regulations
promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.116 The Court
explained that “private rights of action to enforce federal law must be
created by Congress,” and therefore only regulations that “simply apply”
the provisions of a controlling statute can be enforced through a private
cause of action. 117 Title VI, by its terms, prohibits only intentional
discrimination.118 As such, the Court held that disparate impact regulations
are not encompassed within the private right to enforce Title VI. 119
In the wake of Sandoval, some courts have distinguished between Title
VI and Section 504 or Title II, and concluded that disparate impact claims
Courts
brought under Section 504 or Title II are actionable.120
distinguishing Sandoval note that the Choate Court rejected the notion that
Section 504 bars only intentional discrimination, and implied that some
disparate impact claims would be valid.121
Defendants have also argued, in light of Sandoval, that plaintiffs only
have a private right of action to enforce ADA regulations when the claims
are based on intentional discrimination.122 In Ability Center of Greater

may sue to enforce § 601 of Title VI and obtain both injunctive relief and damages.”);
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 703 (1979).
114. It is also worth noting that some states have sought to challenge the constitutionality
of Title II under the Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity. See generally
U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). However, because
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity protects only states, not counties or
municipalities, sovereign immunity has not been an issue in the conflict regarding whether
Title II covers public sidewalks, and is therefore beyond the scope of this Note. See Lincoln
Cnty. v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (“The Eleventh Amendment limits the
jurisdiction only as to suits against a State.”). For a discussion of how the doctrine of state
sovereign immunity impacts Title II actions brought against state entities, see COLKER, supra
note 9, ch. 6.B.
115. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
116. Id. at 293 (“Neither as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display
an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated
under § 602. We therefore hold that no such right of action exists.”).
117. Id. at 285–86.
118. Id. at 280 (“[I]t is . . . beyond dispute—and no party disagrees—that § 601 prohibits
only intentional discrimination.”).
119. Id. at 293.
120. See COLKER, supra note 9, at 555.
121. See, e.g., Frederick L. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 538 (E.D. Pa.
2001) (“[W]hile the conduct regulated by section 601 of Title VI is limited to intentional
discrimination, the same cannot be said for section 504. With section 504, Congress clearly
sought to remedy a problem of a different, and for these purposes broader, nature.” (citations
omitted)).
122. See id. at 538–39 (rejecting the defendants’ argument that the “[p]laintiffs’ ADA
claims must be dismissed in accordance with Sandoval”); see also Access Living v. Chi.
Transit Auth., No. 00-C-0770, 2001 WL 492473, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 9, 2001) (“Defendant
argues that plaintiffs have failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination under the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act because they have failed to present evidence of intentional
discrimination . . . .”).
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Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 123 plaintiffs filed a class action claiming that
the city: (1) did not comply with 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 when replacing and
repairing sidewalks and (2) “failed to adopt a transition plan” in accordance
with 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(d). 124 The city argued that under Sandoval,
individuals do not have a private right of action under Title II to enforce
Title II regulations. 125 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
relying on Choate, found that Title II does not merely prohibit invidious
discrimination, but also requires public entities to make reasonable
accommodations, and “contemplates that such accommodations must
sometimes come in the form of public entities removing architectural
barriers that impede [the] disabled.” 126 The court concluded that 28 C.F.R
§ 35.151 clearly “imposes requirements specifically envisioned” by Title II,
and is therefore “enforceable through Title II’s private cause of action.” 127
A plaintiff bringing a private cause of action under Title II generally must
show that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he is being
excluded from participation in, or being denied the benefits of, a public
entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3) he was excluded or denied
the benefit solely on the basis of his disability. 128
The phrase “program, services, or activities” is not defined in Title II nor
in the implementing regulations promulgated by the DOJ. However, a
number of federal circuit courts have embraced a broad definition of
“services, programs, or activities.” 129 In Innovative Health Systems, Inc. v.
City of White Plains, 130 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found that “[a]ll governmental activities of public entities are covered”
under Title II. 131 Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has held that Congress intended that the phrase “apply to anything a public
entity does,” and therefore found that Title II applies to state and local
correctional facilities.132
123. 385 F.3d 901 (6th Cir. 2004).
124. Id. at 903.
125. See id. at 904.
126. Id. at 907.
127. Id. at 910, 913. However, the court found that the transition plan requirement of 28
C.F.R. § 35.150(d) did “more than simply apply or effectuate [Title II],” and that, therefore,
plaintiffs had no private right of action to force the city to adopt a transition plan. Id. at 914–
15.
128. See, e.g., Melton v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671–72 (5th Cir. 2004)
(citing Lightbourn v. Cnty. of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421, 428 (5th Cir. 1997)); Lovell v.
Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Weinreich v. L.A. Cnty. Metro.
Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997)).
129. See Laurence Paradis, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act: Making Programs, Services, and Activities Accessible to All, 14
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 395–99 (2003). But see Frame v. City of Arlington, 616 F.3d
476, 485–86 (5th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc granted, No. 08-10630, 2011 WL 242385, at *1
(5th Cir. Jan. 26, 2011).
130. 117 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1997), superseded on other grounds, Zervos v. Verizon N.Y.,
Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 171 n.7 (2d Cir. 2001).
131. Innovative Health Sys., Inc., 117 F.3d at 45 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A); 28
C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A at 456 (2010)); see also Paradis, supra note 129, at 397.
132. Yeskey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting 28 C.F.R.
pt. 35, app. A, at 456), aff’d, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998) (“[T]he fact that a statute can be
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As with Section 504, the remedies available in a private cause of action
under Title II include attorney fees, injunctive relief, and compensatory
damages. 133 Punitive damages are not available in a private suit under Title
II. 134 Courts have generally held that compensatory damages are only
available upon a showing of intentional discrimination.135
F. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008
The Supreme Court’s decisions in the Sutton trilogy and Toyota Motor
Manufacturing were met with criticism from the disability rights
community, who argued that the Court’s pro-defendant interpretation of the
ADA was inconsistent with congressional intent. 136 Advocates pointed out
the “Catch-22” created by the Court’s approach to mitigating measures,
under which a person could be considered “too impaired” to be hired, yet
not impaired enough to fall under the protection of the ADA. 137
On September 25, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 138 (ADAAA) into law. 139 In enacting the
ADAAA, Congress sought to “restore the intent and protections of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.”140 Congress determined that the
Supreme Court, in the Sutton trilogy, had “narrowed the broad scope of

‘applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate ambiguity.
It demonstrates breadth.’” (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499
(1985))). Additionally, the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have
found that Title II applies to “virtually everything that a public entity does.” Johnson v. City
of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 1998); see Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc.,
v. City of Milwaukee, 300 F.3d 775, 782 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding Title II covers
“anything a public entity does” (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A)).
133. See supra notes 49, 109 and accompanying text; see also Paradis, supra note 129, at
391–95.
134. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002); see also supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Phx., 157 F.3d 668, 674–75 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding
that plaintiffs must prove intentional discrimination in order to receive compensatory
damages under Section 504 or Title II, but declining to decide whether a “discriminatory
animus” or “deliberate indifference” standard is proper, as the plaintiff’s claims did not pass
either test).
136. See, e.g., Colker, supra note 77, at 34 (arguing that Congress intended to cover
individuals with “both mild and severe disabilities” under the ADA, “[y]et, the Court has
interpreted the ADA inconsistently with that intent, resulting in the ADA . . . only covering
those too disabled to work”).
137. WEBER, supra note 21, at 19–20; see also Pendo, supra note 76, at 261–62
(concluding that in the wake of the Sutton trilogy, “employers [were] free to reject fully
capable workers with correctable impairments without fear of an ADA claim because those
workers [were] not ‘disabled’ as defined by the Court”).
138. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553.
139. 154 CONG. REC. S 9626 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2008) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid)
(noting that the ADAAA passed with “overwhelming, bipartisan support in the Senate and
House of Representatives”).
140. § 2, 122 Stat. at 3553; see 154 CONG. REC. S9626 (“Simply put, the ADA
Amendments Act restores the landmark Americans with Disabilities Act to the civil rights
law it was meant to be.”).
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protection intended to be afforded by the ADA”—excluding individuals
Congress had meant to cover. 141
The ADAAA explicitly rejects the Sutton trilogy requirement that
mitigating measures be taken into account in determining whether a person
is “substantially limited” with respect to a major life activity, as well as
Toyota Motor Manufacturing’s rule that only those activities “of central
importance to most people’s daily lives” constitute major life activities
under the ADA. 142
G. Rules of Statutory Interpretation
As the Sutton trilogy and the ADAAA demonstrate, the breadth of the
ADA’s scope intended by Congress has not always been clear. In Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 143 the Supreme
Court outlined the two-step process governing judicial interpretation of a
statute administered by an executive agency. 144 First, a court must look to
the statute and determine if Congress directly addressed the given issue.145
If, using the “traditional tools of statutory construction,” the court
concludes that the intent of Congress was unambiguous with respect to the
specific issue in question, the court must give effect to that clear intent.146
To determine legislative intent, courts first turn to the plain language of
the statute. 147 Though a word must be given its ordinary meaning, 148 the
words used in a given statute should be considered in context, based upon a
reading of the statutory text in its entirety. 149 If possible, a court must
construe the statute in a way that gives every word “some operative
effect.” 150 However, courts may “reject words ‘as surplusage’” if

141. § 2, 122 Stat. at 3553.
142. Id. at 3554; see supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. Congress declared that
the strict standard for “substantially limits” created by the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor
Manufacturing “created an inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain
coverage under the ADA.” § 2, 122 Stat. at 3554.
143. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
144. See id. at 842–43; see also Ann Graham, Searching for Chevron in Muddy Watters:
The Roberts Court and Judicial Review of Agency Regulations, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 229, 232–
33 (2008).
145. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
146. Id. at 843 n.9.
147. See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) (“In a
statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and
when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute’s meaning, in
all but the most extraordinary circumstances, is finished.” (citing Demarest v. Manspeaker,
498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991))).
148. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993) (“When a word is not defined
by statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.” (citing
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979))).
149. See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006); see also Deal v. United
States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (discussing the “fundamental principle of statutory
construction” that a court must determine the meaning of a word, not in isolation, but in light
of the context in which the word is used).
150. Reich v. Arcadian Corp., 110 F.3d 1192, 1195–96 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting United
States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992)).
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“repugnant to the rest of the statute.”151 In interpreting a word or phrase, a
court should consider the purpose of the statute, and “consult[] any
precedents or authorities” that may be relevant to the analysis.152
If a court determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the question at issue, the court must then turn to the agency’s
interpretation of the statute. 153 So long as the agency interpretation is
“based on a permissible construction of the statute,” a court must defer to
that interpretation. 154 However, an agency’s interpretation only merits
deference “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority.” 155
In discerning the agency’s interpretation of a statute, courts first look to
any regulations the agency has promulgated that address the question at
issue. 156 If an agency regulation is unambiguous, and a reasonable
interpretation of the statute, a court must give effect to that regulation.157
Only when the language of an agency regulation is ambiguous may a court
look to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation. 158 An agency’s
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation is entitled to deference under
Auer v. Robbins, 159 unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.” 160
151. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001).
152. Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486.
153. See Chickasaw, 534 U.S. at 94 (quoting KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION 525 (1960)).
154. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
Additionally, though courts “must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to
clear congressional intent,” an agency interpretation does not have to be the only permissible
interpretation of the statutory provision, or even the interpretation the court would have
reached itself, to be entitled to deference. Id. at 843 n.9 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v.
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32 (1981)).
155. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); see David Goodman,
Recent Case, Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006), 74 TENN. L. REV. 437, 446 (2007)
(discussing the Court’s “force of law” analysis in United States v. Mead Corp.); see also
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (stating that agency interpretations,
such as opinion letters, that “lack the force of law[,] do not warrant Chevron-style deference”
(citing Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995))). An agency interpretation that lacks the
force of law is “‘entitled to respect’ only to the extent it has the ‘power to persuade.’”
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 140 (1944)); see Graham, supra note 144, at 241 (discussing the “very limited”
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. deference standard).
156. See Frame v. City of Arlington, 616 F.3d 476, 483 (5th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc
granted, No. 08-10630, 2011 WL 242385, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 26, 2011).
157. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (noting that where Congress has expressly
delegated an agency the authority to “elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation,” the agency regulation controls unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute”). Even where the legislative delegation was “implicit rather than
explicit,” the agency construction will be given effect if reasonable. Id. at 844.
158. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
159. Id. (deferring to the Department of Labor’s amicus brief in interpreting an
ambiguous agency regulation promulgated to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act). In
Gonzales, the Supreme Court distinguished Chevron from Auer, explaining that Chevron
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II. ARE PUBLIC SIDEWALKS CONSIDERED “SERVICES, PROGRAMS, OR
ACTIVITIES” WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE II?
Courts have disagreed over whether citizens have a private right of action
under Title II to compel a city to maintain public curbs, sidewalks, and
parking lots in compliance with ADA regulations. Specifically, circuits
have split regarding whether public sidewalks are considered “services,
programs, or activities” within the meaning of Title II of the ADA and
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Part II examines the split between the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit regarding
whether public sidewalks qualify as “services, programs, or activities”
covered by Title II. Part II.A outlines the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that
public sidewalks are considered “services, programs, or activities” within
the meaning of Title II, and therefore must comport with the accessibility
requirements of the Title II regulations. Part II.B details the Fifth Circuit’s
contrary determination that public sidewalks are facilities, and therefore not
automatically subject to Title II’s nondiscrimination provisions.
A. Broad Interpretation: Sidewalks Are “Services, Programs, or
Activities” Subject to the Title II Regulations
The Ninth Circuit has endorsed a broad interpretation of “services,
programs, or activities,” concluding that the ADA’s “fundamental purpose”
of eliminating disability discrimination is best served by including public
sidewalks within the phrase “services, programs, or activities.”161 This
section discusses the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Barden v. City of
Sacramento 162 that public sidewalks are a “service, program, or activity”
within the meaning of Title II, and are thus subject to the program
accessibility requirements of the Title II regulations. First, this section
outlines the court’s argument that precedent, the plain language of the
Rehabilitation Act, and the legislative history of Title II support a broad
interpretation of Title II. Then, it details the court’s determination that,
though consistent with the conclusion that sidewalks fall within the scope of
Title II, the regulations are ultimately ambiguous. Next, it examines the
court’s decision, in light of the ambiguity of the Title II regulations, to defer
to the DOJ’s position that public sidewalks are subject to the regulations’
accessibility requirements. Finally, this section discusses the Supreme
deference applies when interpreting an ambiguous statute, whereas Auer deference applies
when interpreting an ambiguous agency regulation. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 255; see Graham,
supra note 144, at 239–41.
160. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (quoting Udall v.
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965)). The Court explained that an agency’s interpretation of its
own regulations must be afforded “substantial deference” and will be given effect unless an
“alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other indications
of the [agency’s] intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation.” Id. at 512 (quoting
Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988)).
161. Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Hason v.
Med. Bd., 279 F.3d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002)).
162. 292 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Court’s decision to deny review, and the state of disability rights advocacy
in the wake of Barden.
In 1999, a group of individuals with mobility and vision impairments
brought a class action against the city of Sacramento, alleging that the city
had violated Title II and section 504 by failing to maintain existing public
sidewalks and to make them accessible to persons with disabilities. 163 The
plaintiffs argued that the city’s failure to remove obstacles such as benches,
sign-posts, and wires violated the program accessibility requirements of
Title II’s implementing regulations. 164 The District Court for the Eastern
District of California partially granted the city’s motion for summary
judgment, concluding that public sidewalks were not a “service, program,
or activity” under Title II. 165 The plaintiffs appealed, and a group of
fourteen disability rights organizations filed an amicus brief in support of
the plaintiffs, 166 as did the Department of Justice. 167
On June 12, 2002, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding
that public sidewalks constitute “services” within the meaning of Title II of
the ADA and are therefore subject to the accessibility requirements of the
ADA regulations. 168 The court determined that a broad reading of the term
“services, programs, or activities” was supported by precedent, the plain
language of the Rehabilitation Act, the legislative history of Title II, and the
DOJ’s interpretation of its own regulation. 169
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit first pointed to the broad interpretation
of the phrase “service, program, or activity” by the U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits. 170 Echoing the reasoning of the
163. See id. at 1075. The plaintiffs also claimed that the city’s failure to install curb cuts
in newly constructed or altered sidewalks was a violation of Title II, but that issue was
settled before the case reached the Ninth Circuit. See id. (reporting that the “parties
stipulated to the entry of an injunction regarding the curb ramps”); see also Cahill, supra
note 14, at 9 (reporting that in the settlement the city agreed to install a specific number of
curb cuts over a thirty-year period).
164. Barden, 292 F.3d at 1075; see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.149–51 (2010 and Mar. 15, 2011
amendments).
165. See Barden, 292 F.3d at 1075.
166. Brief for Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal, Barden, 292
F.3d 1073 (No. 01-15744), 2001 WL 34095025 (submitted on behalf of the Western Law
Center for Disability Rights (WLCDR), the American Association of People with
Disabilities (AAPD), the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems
(NAPAS), the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Inc. (DREDF), the United
Cerebral Palsy Association (UCP), Protection and Advocacy, Inc. (PAI), the National Senior
Citizens Law Center, ADAPT, the California Council of the Blind (CCB), the American
Association of Retired Persons (AARP), the Gray Panthers, the National Multiple Sclerosis
Society, Californians for Disability Rights (CDR), and the California Foundation for
Independent Living Centers (CFILC)).
167. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Barden, 292
F.3d 1073 (No. 01-15744), 2001 WL 354095025.
168. See Barden, 292 F.3d at 1074.
169. See id. at 1076–78.
170. See id. at 1076 (citing Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 1998);
Yeskey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1997), aff’d, 524 U.S. 206 (1998);
Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1997),
superseded on other grounds, Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 171 n.7 (2d Cir.
2001)); see also supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
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Second Circuit in Innovative Health Systems, the Ninth Circuit noted the
inefficiency of requiring courts to engage in the sort of “hair-splitting” that
would be involved in determining which public functions technically
qualify as “services, programs, or activities.” 171
Following the precedent set by Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 172 in which it
embraced the Third Circuit’s interpretation of Title II’s plain language as
“bring[ing] within its scope ‘anything a public entity does,’” 173 the court
reasoned that the proper question was not whether a public function could
technically be considered a service, program, or activity, but rather
“whether it is ‘a normal function of a governmental entity.’” 174 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that maintaining a system of public sidewalks is “without
a doubt something that the [City] ‘does,’” and therefore falls under the
purview of Title II. 175
The court next turned to the plain language of the statute. 176 The court
acknowledged that the phrase “services, programs, or activities” is not
defined in the ADA, but noted that the Rehabilitation Act defines “program
or activity” as “all the operations” of an eligible state or local
government. 177 Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the legislative history of
the ADA provides that Title II “‘simply extends the anti-discrimination
prohibition embodied in § 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] to all actions of
state and local governments.’” 178
The court next examined the language of the program accessibility
requirements set forth in Title II’s implementing regulations. 179 The court
noted that though section 35.150 prioritizes the provision of curb ramps for
“walkways serving government offices, ‘transportation, places of public
accommodation, and employers,’” the regulation mandates that curb cuts be
installed in “‘walkways serving other areas’” as well.180 The court
explained that section 35.150’s requirement that curb cuts be installed in all
sidewalks evidenced a “general concern for the accessibility of public
sidewalks” and a “recognition” that public sidewalks fall within the scope
of the ADA. 181 However, the court concluded that in spite of this, the

171. Id. at 1076 (quoting Innovative Health Sys., 117 F.3d at 45).
172. 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001).
173. Id. at 691 (quoting Yeskey, 118 F.3d at 171).
174. Barden, 292 F.3d at 1076 (quoting Bay Area Addiction Research & Treatment, Inc.,
v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1999)).
175. Id. (quoting Hason v. Med. Bd. of Cal., 279 F.3d 1167, 1173 (9th Cir. 2002)).
176. See id. at 1076–77.
177. Id. at 1077; see Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(B) (2006);
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
178. Barden, 292 F.3d at 1077 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 84 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 367); see also supra note 90 (stating that because Title
II is modeled after section 504, precedent interpreting either is applicable to both).
179. See Barden, 292 F.3d at 1075–77 (detailing the provisions of 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.149–
151 (2010)); see also supra Part I.E.2.
180. Barden, 292 F.3d at 1077 (quoting 28 C.F.R § 35.150(d)(2)); see supra note 106 and
accompanying text.
181. Barden, 292 F.3d at 1077 (citing 28 C.F.R § 35.150).
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regulation is ambiguous because it provides for curb ramps but does not
specifically mention sidewalks. 182
Deeming the language of section 35.150 ambiguous, the court turned to
the interpretation provided by the DOJ, the agency responsible for
promulgating the accessibility regulations.183 The DOJ took the position
that sidewalks are subject to the program accessibility requirements of Title
II. 184 The DOJ’s interpretation is entitled to deference under Auer, the
court explained, unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.” 185
The court explained that because, logically, mandating curb ramps would
be useless unless the sidewalks between were required to be accessible, the
DOJ’s stance was not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the language of
section 35.150. 186 Consequently, the court deferred to the DOJ’s
interpretation of its own regulation. 187 Based on the foregoing analysis, the
Ninth Circuit held that sidewalks do constitute a “service, program, or
activity . . . within the meaning of Title II,” and thus must comply with the
program accessibility requirements of the Title II regulations. 188 The court
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether bringing the
sidewalk system into compliance would impose “undue financial and
administrative burdens” on the city of Sacramento.189
After the city of Sacramento filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the
Supreme Court, the Court invited the Solicitor General to file a brief
expressing the opinion of the United States, which the Solicitor General did
in May of 2003. 190 In its amicus brief, the Solicitor General opined that the
Ninth Circuit was correct in holding that public sidewalks are subject to the
accessibility requirements of Title II. 191 On June 27, 2003, the Supreme
Court denied review in Barden. 192
182. Id. at 1077.
183. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2006); supra note 95 and accompanying text.
184. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, supra note
167, at 5–7; see also Barden, 292 F.3d at 1077; Cahill, supra note 14, at 9 (reporting that the
Ninth Circuit cited an amicus brief submitted by the DOJ, concluding that sidewalks are
subject to program accessibility regulations).
185. Barden, 292 F.3d at 1077 (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997);
Alhambra Hosp. v. Thompson, 259 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001)).
186. Id.; see supra notes 97, 102–04 and accompanying text.
187. Barden, 292 F.3d at 1077; see also 1 Americans with Disabilities: Practice and
Compliance Manual, supra note 43, § 2:26 (stating that in Barden, the Ninth Circuit held
that the “Department of Justice’s interpretation of its own accessibility regulation under the
ADA . . . was entitled to deference . . . where the regulation was ambiguous, since it
addressed curb ramps but not sidewalks, and such interpretation was not plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation”).
188. Barden, 292 F.3d at 1074.
189. Id. at 1078 & n.6 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (2010)).
190. See City of Sacramento v. Barden, 537 U.S. 1231, 1231 (2003) (“The Solicitor
General is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of the United States.”); see
also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, City of Sacramento v. Barden, 539 U.S.
958 (2003) (No. 02-815), available at http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2002/2pet/6invit/
2002-0815.pet.ami.inv.pdf.
191. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 190, at 7–8 (reasoning
that Sacramento’s provision of a public sidewalk system constituted a fundamental service,
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Barden was heralded as a major victory for disability rights advocates,
and has inspired disability rights advocates to file similar lawsuits in cities
across the country. 193 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana recently considered whether the “services, programs, or activities”
of a city includes public sidewalks in Culvahouse v. City of Laporte.194
The court, in line with Barden, found that Title II is “broad enough to
include public sidewalks within the scope of a city’s services, programs, or
activities.” 195
In August of 2006, Californians for Disability Rights (CDR), the
California Counsel for the Blind, and California residents Ben Rockwell
and Dmitri Belser filed a class action lawsuit against the California
Department of Transportation (Caltrans), among other parties, alleging that
Caltrans had failed to make existing sidewalks and Park and Ride facilities
accessible to individuals with disabilities.196 On June 2, 2010, the District
Court for the Northern District of California approved a settlement
agreement in which Caltrans agreed to spend $1.1 billion over the next
thirty years to remove barriers and improve sidewalk accessibility in
California. 197
and that when a resident is denied the use of that sidewalk system because the sidewalks are
inaccessible, “he or she is ‘excluded from,’ and ‘denied the benefits of,’ the ‘services,
programs, or activities of a public entity’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006))); see also
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., DISABILITY RIGHTS SECTION, ENFORCING THE
ADA: A STATUS REPORT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 2–3 (2003), available at
http://www.ada.gov/aprjun03prt.pdf (stating that the DOJ’s brief also argued that
Sacramento’s concern that it would incur “staggering costs” was unfounded in light of “title
II’s undue financial and administrative burdens defense”).
192. See City of Sacramento v. Barden, 539 U.S. 958 (2003) (denying certiorari); see also
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 191, at 2 (reporting that the Supreme Court declined to
review Barden).
193. See Joyner, supra note 10, at 3A (describing Scott Crawford’s lawsuit against the
city of Jackson, Mississippi, as “aimed at getting the city to comply with ADA standards by
making sidewalks, bus stops and other public areas accessible to the disabled”); see also
Elizabeth Campbell, Disabled Arlington Man Continues His Quest for Access, STARTELEGRAM, Sept. 11, 2010, http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/09/11/2461097/disabledarlington-man-continues.html (reporting twenty lawsuits filed by the Texas Civil Rights
Project and ADAPT of Texas alleging that Texas cities, counties, and businesses have
violated the ADA in a range of ways, including inaccessible sidewalks).
194. 679 F. Supp. 2d 931, 939 (N.D. Ind. 2009).
195. Id. at 939 (citing Frame v. City of Arlington, 575 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2009)
(granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability), withdrawn and
superseded on reh’g, 616 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2010)).
196. See Californians for Disability Rights, Inc. v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., No. C 06-5125,
2009 WL 2982840, at *1 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 14, 2009); see also Joyner, supra note 10, at 3A
(noting that California faced “potentially billions of dollars in sidewalk-repair costs” should
it lose).
197. Californians for Disability Rights, Inc., v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., No. C 06-5125,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62837, at *6, 28 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2010) (approving settlement in
which Caltrans agreed to: (1) a commitment to a spend $1.1 billion over the next thirty years
to make walkways more accessible; (2) a “monitoring procedure” to oversee compliance
during the first seven years and mandatory annual reporting for thirty years; (3) a “grievance
procedure” to handle public complaints regarding accessibility; and (4) a payment of
attorney’s fees not less than $3.75 million but not to exceed $8.75 million for “past work and
future compliance services”); see also Riya Bhattacharjee, Caltrans Settles Class Action
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B. Narrow Interpretation: Public Sidewalks Are Facilities, Do Not Qualify
as “Services, Programs, or Activities” Under Title II
Not all courts have found the Ninth Circuit’s broad interpretation of Title
II persuasive. The Northern District of Indiana, though agreeing in
Culvahouse that sidewalks constitute a “service, program, or activity” of a
public entity within the meaning of Title II, chose not to endorse the Ninth
Circuit interpretation of “programs, services, or activities” as “anything a
public entity does.” 198 In addition, the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey, in an unpublished opinion, explicitly disagreed with the
Ninth Circuit and concluded that sidewalks are “facilities” that do not
themselves constitute “programs, services, or activities” under the ADA.199
The court pointed out that the ADA regulations include sidewalks in the
definition of “facilities” and argued that while a public entity must ensure
that its services are accessible, the regulations do not require that each
existing facility be made readily accessible.200
Part II.B details the argument in favor of a narrow interpretation of Title
II, under which public sidewalks do not in themselves qualify as “services,
programs, or activities.” Part II.B.1 examines the concern presented by city
advocates that deeming sidewalks “services” under the ADA imposes
significant fiscal burdens on cities and municipalities. Part II.B.2 outlines
the Fifth Circuit’s determination in Frame v. City of Arlington201 that a
narrow interpretation of the phrase “services, programs, or activities” is
proper given the “clear” congressional intent to distinguish between
“physical infrastructures” and the “services to which they provide
access.” 202

Disability-Access
Lawsuit,
BERKELEY
DAILY
P LANET,
Jan.
07,
2010,
http://www.berkeleydailyplanet.com/issue/2010-01-07/article/34425 (reporting Caltrans’
announcement of the settlement agreement, a “landmark achievement for disability rights
advocates”). California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger lauded the agreement as “a
victory for all Californians—taxpayers and the disability community who have a right to
equal access to all walkways.” Id. at 22.
198. See Culvahouse 679 F. Supp. 2d at 939 (acknowledging that “the [ADA] may not
mandate that the phrase ‘services, programs, or activities’ encompass, without exception, all
things that a public entity does” (citing Frame, 575 F.3d at 437)).
199. See N.J. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc., v. Twp. of Riverside, No. 04-5914, 2006 WL
2226332, at *3 & n.4 (D.N.J. Aug. 2, 2006) (noting that the Title II regulations “explicitly
refer to walks and roadways as ‘facilities,’ rather than activities, programs, or services”).
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey argued that the fact that a city provides
the service of maintaining a facility does not make the facility a service, and that such a
reading would render 28 C.F.R § 35.104 superfluous. See id. at *3 (maintaining that the
Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Barden “ignores the distinction between a city’s responsibility to
maintain sidewalks and the enterprises ordinarily deemed programs, services, and
activities.”).
200. See id. at *2.
201. 616 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc granted, No. 08-10630, 2011 WL
242385 (5th Cir. Jan. 26, 2011).
202. Id. at 485–86.
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1. Policy Considerations in Favor of a Narrow Interpretation of “Services,
Programs, or Activities”
Those opposed to a broad reading of Title II argue that public policy
weighs against deeming public sidewalks “services” under the ADA. 203 In
Barden, over seventy-five California cities joined the National League of
Cities’ amicus brief in support of the city of Sacramento. 204 When the
Ninth Circuit ruled against Sacramento, hundreds of cities offered to
support Sacramento’s efforts to have the Ninth Circuit’s ruling overturned
by the Supreme Court, including Phoenix, Denver, and New York City. 205
City advocates argue that the Ninth Circuit failed to appreciate the
financial implications of requiring cities to ensure sidewalks are readily
accessible to people with disabilities. 206 Local government representatives
frame the issue as a “stand against unfunded federal mandates” and contend
that cities simply do not have the resources to bring miles of public
sidewalk into immediate compliance with Title II regulations.207
203. See Brief of the National League of Cities and 76 Cal. Cities as Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellees at 3–6, Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2002)
(No. 01-15744), 2001 WL 34095218 at *3–6 [hereinafter Brief of the National League of
Cities] (arguing that under the “clear language” of the ADA regulations, a public entity is
only required to remove the “‘physical obstacles in [its] facilities that limit the accessibility
of its programs or activities to individuals with disabilities’” (quoting 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.150(d)(3)(i) (2010))). The amici maintained that if a facility could itself constitute a
program, every structure and facility would have to be made accessible at “enormous cost,
regardless of whether programs were offered at those structures and facilities,” overturning
“the entire regulatory framework for disabled access.” Id. at 3.
204. See id. at 1–2 (submitted on behalf of the National League of Cities and seventy-six
California cities).
205. See Some Cities Changes [sic] Sides, Withdraw Support for Sacramento Appeal,
RAGGED
EDGE
ONLINE,
Jan.
11,
2003,
http://ragged-edgemag.com/drn/sacramento110102.html [hereinafter Some Cities Change Sides] (reporting that
“hundreds” of cities “offered to sign onto a friend-of-the-court brief supporting
Sacramento”); see also Cities Join Sacramento to Take Sidewalk Access Fight to Supreme
Court,
RAGGED
EDGE
ONLINE,
Nov.
25,
2002,
http://ragged-edgemag.com/drn/sacramento110102.html (reporting that Sacramento claimed to “already ha[ve]
the support of 75 cities, including Phoenix, Denver and New York City”). However, several
California cities that supported Sacramento at the appellate level, including San Anselmo,
San Rafael, Corte Madera, Mill Valley, and San Diego, “change[d] sides” and decided not to
support Sacramento in its appeal to the Supreme Court. See Some Cities Change Sides, supra
(reporting the San Rafael city manager’s statement that the city withdrew its support for
Sacramento upon learning the case “is being seen as a major civil rights struggle”); see also
Dwight Daniels, City Reverses Course on Sidewalk Repairs, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec.
20, 2002, at B2 (discussing San Diego city attorney Casey Gwinn’s decision to “reverse
course” after meeting with disability advocates, researching the law, and “doing some soul
searching”).
206. See Cahill, supra note 14, at 9 (discussing National League of Cities’ attorney Greg
F. Hurley’s statement that the Ninth Circuit’s decision “ignores the limitations on public
entities” given the “phenomenally expensive task” of bringing thousands of miles of
sidewalk into compliance with ADA accessibility regulations); see also Some Cities Change
Sides, supra note 205 (providing Sacramento Public Works Director Mike Kashawagi’s
comment that “[t]he financial implications for cities, counties, telecommunications and
utility companies if [the Barden] decision is permitted to stand are enormous”).
207. See Daniels, supra note 205, at 1 (providing California League of Cities
spokeswoman Megan Taylor’s explanation that the league’s support of Sacramento “has
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Bringing sidewalks into compliance with ADA accessibility regulations
is an expensive task, with the cost easily running into the millions.208 In
1998, the Los Angeles City Council approved a ballot measure that would
allot almost $770 million to repair damaged sidewalks over a twenty year
period, $171.8 million of which would be designated for curb cuts and other
ADA mandated improvements. 209 Pasadena, California spent $9.7 million
over a five year period to fix damaged sidewalks. 210 The city of Little
Rock, Arkansas, spent $2600 widening one stretch of sidewalk to allow
wheelchair users room to maneuver around a single utility pole.211 As
Lancaster City, Pennsylvania Mayor Rick Gray commented when faced
with the $4 million cost of bringing Lancaster’s curb ramps into ADA
compliance: “Regulations are cheap. Implementation is expensive.”212
City advocates point out that Congress outlined separate standards for
new facilities and existing facilities in recognition of the prohibitive cost of
requiring a city to update its entire public infrastructure at one time. 213
They argue that imposing a program-access standard with regard to
sidewalks that do not affect access to government programs hinders a public
entity’s’ ability to realize the program accessibility envisioned by the
ADA. 214 City advocates reason that it is more cost effective to concentrate
nothing to do with cities being for or against the issues the disabled community is raising”
but is a “question of resources”). Taylor cautioned that California’s budget deficit of over
$30 billion will further limit resources, and pointed out that cities still have to “make sure
bridges don’t fall down and children go to school in public buildings where the toilets flush.”
Id.
208. See, e.g., Andy Davis, LR Adding Wheelchair Curb Ramps Around City, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 2, 2005, at 1B (discussing statement of the assistant director of
public works that moving obstacles such as utility poles, traffic signals, and hydrants would
“cost tens of thousands of dollars”); see also Erin Emery, Disabled See Barriers in Pueblo,
DENVER POST, Aug. 17, 2003, at 1B (reporting that the city of Pueblo, Colorado has
“millions of dollars of work to do” to comply with the ADA, and noting that it will cost “at
least $20 million” to fix “curb cuts and ramps on sidewalks” and “problems in buildings”);
Anne Belli Gesalman, Disabilities Act Spurs Changes, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Oct. 8, 1995,
at 37A (commenting that “[i]n addition to the $1 million already spent, the city of Dallas
plans to spend at least another $750,000 over the next several years on ADA improvement”).
209. Sue McAllister, A Deeply Rooted Problem, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1998, at B2.
210. Id.
211. See Andy Davis, Sidewalk Where Pole Posed Issue Is Widened, ARK. DEMOCRATGAZETTE, Mar. 3, 2005, at 1B.
212. Bernard Harris, How Many Ramps Must Be Redone?, LANCASTER NEW ERA, Feb.
22, 2007, at A1; see also George Merritt, Still Battling Barriers: Costs, Intricate Rules
Make Goal of 1990 Disabilities Law Elusive, DENVER POST, Feb. 1, 2004, at 1B (providing
Pueblo City Manager Lee Evett’s comment regarding the $20 million worth of curb
modifications needed in Pueblo: “we want to comply, but who can pay for that? . . . The
feds don’t want to pay for it, the state doesn’t want to pay for it, we can’t pay for it—even
the Justice Department doesn’t know what to do”).
213. See Brief for the National League of Cities, supra note 203, at 3.
214. See id. (arguing that Congress “sought to balance the societal interest in greater
disabled access with the need to ensure the efficient use of limited public resources”); see
also Brief for Texas Municipal League and International Municipal Lawyers Ass’n as Amici
Curiae in Support of the Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 4, Frame v. City of
Arlington, 575 F.3d 432 (5th. Cir. 2009) (Nos. 08-10630, 08-10631), 2009 WL 6706544 at
*4 [hereinafter Brief for Texas Municipal League] (arguing that Congress enacted
regulations requiring “immediate access to programs but more gradual, incremental
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limited funds on facilities where the accessibility of government services,
programs, and activities is a problem. 215
2. Frame v. City of Arlington: Title II Coverage of Public Sidewalks
Contingent on Whether Noncompliance Hinders Access to “Actual”
Services
In August of 2010, the Fifth Circuit adopted a narrow interpretation in
Frame v. City of Arlington that public sidewalks are not, in themselves
“services, programs, or activities,” and therefore, plaintiffs have a private
cause of action to enforce the Title II regulations only to the extent that
noncompliant sidewalks prevent access to “actual” government services,
programs, or activities. 216 This section will begin by detailing the court’s
determination that the statutory text, though ambiguous, supports a narrow
construction of Title II. Second, this section discusses the court’s
conclusion that the language and structure of the Title II regulations
unambiguously indicates that sidewalks constitute facilities as distinct from
the services to which they provide access.
In 2008, two disabled residents sued the city of Arlington under Title II
and section 504, citing over one hundred inaccessible curbs and
sidewalks. 217 The plaintiffs requested an injunction requiring the city of
Arlington to bring any non-accessible curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots
into compliance with ADA regulations. 218
In its original opinion in Frame v. City of Arlington, 219 the Fifth Circuit
concluded that sidewalks, curbs, and parking lots are considered “services,
programs, or activities” within the meaning of Title II. 220 Both parties
disagreed with the court’s rulings, and the panel granted a petition for
rehearing. 221 After rehearing the case, the Fifth Circuit withdrew its earlier
implementation of access to facilities” in an effort to balance the desire to achieve
accessibility with the “tremendous financial costs” on public entities).
215. See Brief of the National League of Cities, supra note 203, at 16.
216. Frame v. City of Arlington, 616 F.3d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc
granted, No. 08-10630, 2011 WL 242385, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 26, 2011).
217. Id. Both plaintiffs had mobility impairments that necessitated the use of motorized
wheelchairs. Id. The plaintiffs complained of “missing or badly sloped curb ramps;
impassable, noncontinuous or nonexistent sidewalks; and inadequate handicap parking.” OpEd., Under ADA, Is a Sidewalk an Essential Service or an Amenity?, STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug.
24, 2010, http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/08/24/2422898/under-ada-is-a-sidewalk-anessential.html.
218. See Frame, 616 F.3d at 481.
219. 575 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2009), withdrawn and superseded on reh’g by 616 F.3d 476
(5th Cir. 2010).
220. Frame, 575 F.3d at 436–37. The Fifth Circuit also held that plaintiffs’ Title II
claims accrued on the date the city completed the noncompliant construction or alterations,
not when individual plaintiffs actually encountered such noncompliant barriers. Id. at 441.
221. See Frame, 616 F.3d at 479. Plaintiffs challenged the court’s decision on the statute
of limitations issue. See id. at 479 n.1. The city of Arlington contested the court’s
conclusion that sidewalks, curbs, and parking lots constitute “services, programs, or
activities” within the meaning of Title II, and the Texas Municipal League and the
International Lawyers Association filed an amicus brief in support of the City’s petition for
rehearing. See Brief for Texas Municipal League, supra note 214.
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opinion and held that public sidewalks, curbs, and parking lots cannot, in
themselves, be considered “services, programs, or activities” within the
meaning of the ADA. 222 The court concluded that sidewalks, curbs, and
parking lots are “facilities” and therefore plaintiffs did not have a private
cause of action to enforce the Title II regulations unless the noncompliant
sidewalks prevent access to an actual service, program, or activity. 223
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that other circuits had broadly
interpreted the language of Title II to encompass public sidewalks, but
maintained that the Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits failed to
conduct a “thorough analysis” of the issue. 224 The court concluded that it
was “certain” that “services, programs, or activities” could not include
“anything a public entity does” as the Ninth Circuit had previously held in
Barden. 225
Turning first to the statutory text, the Fifth Circuit noted that Title II does
not define the phrase “services, programs, or activities,” but found the
statutory definition of “‘qualified individual with a disability’”
instructive. 226 Section 12131(2) defines a “‘qualified individual with a
disability’” as a person who “‘with or without . . . the removal of . . .
transportation barriers . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for
the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided
by a public entity.’” 227 The court reasoned that this definition indicated
Congress’s intent to differentiate between physical infrastructures and the
“‘services’ to which they provide access.” 228
The court explained that a narrow reading of the statute was also
supported by the “ordinary, ‘everyday meaning’” of the term “service.” 229
The court cited a dictionary defining a “service” as “‘the duties, work, or
business performed or discharged by a government official’” and “‘the
provision, organization, or apparatus for . . . meeting a general demand.’”230
222. See Frame, 616 F.3d at 479–80 & n.1; see also Under ADA, Is a Sidewalk an
Essential Service or an Amenity?, supra note 217 (reporting that the Fifth Circuit’s decision
to “reverse[] itself and on a 2-1 vote offer[] a narrow interpretation of the ADA’s
requirements”).
223. See Frame, 616 F.3d at 488; see also Greer v. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist., No.
3:08-CV-160-M, 2010 WL 4607393, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2010) (relying on Frame in
concluding that plaintiff could not prove a claim for injunctive relief under Title II based on
noncompliant parking spaces and a noncompliant ramp at a school football stadium because
she failed to prove she was denied access to the services at the field).
224. Frame, 616 F.3d at 485 n.10.
225. Id. at 485. The dissent argued that the majority cited no case law in support of this
narrow interpretation. See id. at 494 (Prado, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
226. Id. at 485–86 (majority opinion) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1231(2), 12312 (2006)).
227. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)); see supra note 94.
228. Frame, 616 F.3d at 486.
229. Id. (citing United States v. Hildenbrand, 527 F.3d 466, 476 (5th Cir. 2008)).
230. Id. (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2075
(1993)). In its original opinion the Fifth Circuit consulted a different dictionary, which
defined a “service” as “a facility supplying some public demand.” See Frame v. City of
Arlington, 575 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1137 (11th ed. 2003)), withdrawn and superseded on reh’g by 616 F.3d 476
(5th Cir. 2010). Upon rehearing, the dissent argued that sidewalks constitute a public service
under either definition because a public entity, in providing and maintaining sidewalks,
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The court reasoned that while a public entity arguably provides an
“apparatus” by building and maintaining public sidewalks, the
infrastructure itself does not constitute a service.231
The Fifth Circuit noted that this analysis of the statutory text supports the
conclusion that sidewalks constitute infrastructure, as distinct from the
However, the court
services to which they provide access. 232
acknowledged that the term “services” could be interpreted more broadly,
as Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit precedent has indicated, and
ultimately concluded that the statute was ambiguous. 233
The Fifth Circuit therefore looked to the regulations promulgated by the
DOJ. 234 The court determined that the language and structure of the
regulations, taken together, “clearly indicate[d]” that sidewalks, curbs, and
parking lots do not constitute “services, programs, or activities” within the
meaning of the ADA. 235 The Fifth Circuit claimed that the fact that the
section 35.104 definition of “facilities” includes sidewalks, curbs, and
parking lots “strongly suggests” they do not qualify as “services, programs,
or activities.” 236 The court found additional support in section 35.149,
which prohibits a public entity from excluding disabled individuals from
“services, programs, or activities” because of the inaccessibility of its
facilities. 237 The court argued that reading facilities as a subset of services
would render section 35.149 redundant, prohibiting inaccessible services
that exclude the disabled from “services.”238 Thus, the court reasoned,
facilities and services must be considered “mutually exclusive”
categories. 239
Finally, the court took note of the “unique framework of regulatory
requirements” established for facilities, which outlines different
accessibility requirements for new facilities, as opposed to alterations of
existing facilities.240 The court argued that subjecting facilities to the same
regulatory requirements as services would render the facilities regulations
“superfluous.” 241 The court explained that if facilities were considered
services, they would be subject to the “immediate compliance” requirement
“performs the ‘work’ traditionally undertaken by a municipality.” Frame, 616 F.3d at 491
(Prado, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
231. See Frame, 616 F.3d at 486 (majority opinion).
232. See id.
233. See id. (“[W]e cannot conclude that the statutory language unambiguously excludes
cities’ and states’ physical infrastructure as distinct from the panoply of less tangible benefits
cities and states offer to their residents . . . .”).
234. See id. at 486–87 (discussing 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 35.130, 35.149–59 (2010)); see
supra Part I.E.2.
235. Frame, 616 F.3d at 488 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.149–51).
236. Id. at 487 (noting that sidewalks, parking lots, and curbs are “clustered” with items,
such as equipment, that “clearly do not qualify as ‘services, programs, or activities’”); see 28
C.F.R. § 35.104.
237. See Frame, 616 F.3d at 487 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.149).
238. See id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.149).
239. See id.
240. See id. (arguing that if facilities qualified as “‘services, programs, or activities,’ they
would be subject to the regulatory language in § 35.149”).
241. Id. at 487–88 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.149–51).
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of § 35.149, negating the “general accessibility” requirements of the
facilities regulations, which provide for a “phasing-in of compliant
facilities.” 242
In light of the language and structure of the ADA regulations, the court
found that the regulations “clearly indicate[d]” that sidewalks, curbs, and
parking lots are “facilities” that do not qualify as “services, programs, or
activities” under Title II. 243 Because the court found that the Title II
regulations unambiguously indicated Congress’s intent to distinguish
between “services” and “facilities” and to deem sidewalks facilities, it did
not address the DOJ’s interpretation of the regulations.244 The Fifth Circuit
held that plaintiffs have no cause of action to “enforce the regulatory
requirements” with respect to those facilities unless they prevent access to
some actual service, program, or activity. 245
The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Frame was not unanimous, and Judge
Edward C. Prado wrote a vigorous dissent on the issue of whether
sidewalks constitute a “service” within the meaning of Title II. 246 Judge
Prado argued that the issue is not whether sidewalks are themselves a
service, but whether a city provides a service through the construction,
maintenance, or alteration of those sidewalks. 247
Judge Prado found that the majority’s holding was contrary to
congressional intent. 248 He contended that the plain language of the statute
“unambiguous[ly]” provides that the phrase “services, programs, and
activities” should be interpreted broadly, and argued that sidewalks, parking
lots, and curbs clearly qualify as a “service” within the ordinary meaning of
the word. 249
Judge Prado noted that even if the statute could be considered
ambiguous, the plain language of the relevant regulations “demonstrates
that providing sidewalks is a public service,” as does the legislative history

242. Id. (discussing 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.149–51); see supra notes 100–04 and accompanying
text.
243. Id. at 488.
244. Id. at 480, 483 (upon finding the statutory text ambiguous, looking first to the
implementing regulation and only deferring to the agency’s interpretation of its own
regulations if “the regulations are ‘ambigu[ous] with respect to the specific question
considered’”) (quoting Moore v. Hannon Food Serv., 317 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2003)).
245. Id. at 488, 490. The court provided that district courts should not apply any “set
proximity limitation of the sidewalk to the benefit” in determining whether an individual has
effectively been denied the benefit of a public service due to the inaccessibility of a
sidewalk. Id. at 484 & n.9.
246. See id. at 490–96 (Prado, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
247. See id. at 490 (“I fear that the majority departs dramatically from congressional
intent and creates a distinction that is unworkable and ultimately meaningless.”).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 491–92 (interpreting the language of Title II as “providing broad coverage”
and arguing that “[a] statute is not ambiguous simply because it offers expansive coverage”).
Judge Prado commented that other circuits have “consistently held” that the phrase
“services, programs, or activities” provides broad coverage under Title II. Id. at 491.
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of Title II. 250 In Judge Prado’s view, though the regulations distinguish
between facilities and services, the provision of those facilities still
constitutes a service. 251
Finally, Judge Prado deemed the majority’s standard “unworkable,”
given the difficulty in determining which sidewalks qualify as Title II
services and which do not. 252 Judge Prado reasoned that without any
proximity limitation, only “sidewalks to nowhere” would not meet the
majority’s standard, and questioned whether any sidewalk truly “goes
nowhere.” 253
III. PUBLIC SIDEWALKS ARE COVERED “SERVICES, PROGRAMS, OR
ACTIVITIES” UNDER TITLE II OF THE ADA
Part II of this Note detailed the circuit split regarding the reach of Title
II’s nondiscrimination mandate, specifically whether the phrase “services,
programs, or activities” encompasses public sidewalks. 254 The Ninth
Circuit has endorsed a broad reading of Title II and held that public
sidewalks are a “service, program, or activity” within the meaning of the
statute. The Fifth Circuit has read Title II more narrowly, and held that
public sidewalks are facilities that do not qualify as “programs, services, or
activities.” Title II was passed as part of the ADA, a civil rights statute that
represents the culmination of the disability rights movement. 255 Enacted to
facilitate the “integrated participation of people with disabilities in all
aspects of community life,” 256 Title II provides that public entities shall not
exclude disabled persons from, or deny them the benefits of, government
“services, programs, or activities.” 257 Part III of this Note argues that the
250. Id. at 492–94 (pointing out that “[c]urb ramps and sidewalks are specifically
mentioned in 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(e)(2)” and arguing that “[i]t would be contrary to the
purpose of the ADA for a public entity to erect non-compliant sidewalks”).
251. See id. at 493 (“Although the regulations may set apart facilities from services,
nothing in the regulations suggests that when a public entity provides those facilities, it does
not provide a service.”).
252. Id. at 494.
253. Id. at 495. Following the Fifth Circuit’s August 23, 2010 ruling in Frame, the
plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing en banc on September 7, 2010, and the DOJ filed an
amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs’ position. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Frame, 616 F.3d 476 (No.
08-10630), 2010 WL 5306469. In its brief, the DOJ argued, in line with Barden and the
Fifth Circuit’s first opinion in Frame, that the provision and maintenance of public services
constitute “services, programs, or activities” within the meaning of Title II, and agreed with
Judge Prado that the Fifth Circuit’s distinction between public sidewalks that lead to public
functions that are programs, services, or activities, and those that do not is “unworkable in
practice.” Id. at 14–15. The Fifth Circuit granted the petition for rehearing en banc on
January 26, 2010. Frame v. City of Arlington, No. 08-10630, 2011 WL 242385, at *1 (5th
Cir. Jan. 26, 2011).
254. See supra Part II.
255. See supra Part I.D.1.
256. H.R. REP. No. 101-485(III), at 49–50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
472–73 (noting that integrated public services are “essential” to achieving the goals of Title
II and eliminating the “invisibility of the handicapped”); see supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
257. See supra Part I.E.1.
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statutory text, legislative history, implementing regulations, and agency
interpretation of those implementing regulations support the Ninth Circuit’s
conclusion that public sidewalks constitute a “service, program, or activity”
of a public entity within the meaning of Title II of the ADA and section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act.
First, this part argues that the plain language of Title II unambiguously
indicates that public sidewalks are a covered “service, program, or
activity”—a conclusion further supported by the legislative history of Title
II. Then, this part posits that even supposing Title II could be considered
ambiguous, the plain language of the Title II regulations evidences the
DOJ’s clear view that public sidewalks are a “service, program, or activity”
within the meaning of Title II—an interpretation entitled to substantial
deference under Chevron.
Next, this part contends that even if the Title II regulations were unclear,
the DOJ’s position that public sidewalks are subject to the accessibility
requirements of the Title II regulations is entitled to deference under Auer.
Finally, this part reasons that applying the nondiscrimination provision of
Title II to sidewalks would not require cities to immediately replace their
entire sidewalk system, and that the undue burden provision in the Title II
regulations protects cities from excessive expenses associated with bringing
sidewalks into compliance with the ADA.
A. The Provision, Construction, and Maintenance of a Public Sidewalk
System Is a “Service,” Program, or Activity” Within the Meaning of Title II
Title II provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall . . .
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity.” 258 In interpreting Title II,
Chevron requires that a court first look to the statutory language and
determine whether Congress clearly intended sidewalks to fall within Title
II’s purview. 259 This section argues that using the “traditional tools of
statutory construction,” an analysis of Title II makes it clear that the phrase
“services, programs, or activities” is broad enough to include the provision
and maintenance of a system of public sidewalks.260
Though Title II does not define the term “services, programs, or
activities,” section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act defines the statutory phrase
“program or activity” as “all the operations” of a qualifying local
government. 261 Because Title II was modeled on section 504, and the ADA
explicitly provides that the provisions of the ADA should not be “construed
to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under Title V of the

258. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
259. See supra Part I.G.
260. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 42, 89–90 and accompanying text. Similarly, the legislative history
of Title II indicates that Title II was meant to extend the provisions of section 504 to “all
actions of state and local governments.” See supra note 178.
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Rehabilitation Act,” the statutory text of Title II should be interpreted as
broadly as the section 504 definition of “programs or activities.”262
The Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have concluded that the
phrase “services, programs, or activities” is purposefully expansive. 263 The
ordinary meaning of the word “service” is necessarily broad, as evidenced
by the multiple expansive definitions of the term. 264 When a local
government provides a public sidewalk system, it performs the “work” of a
public official by providing a “facility supplying [a] public demand” and an
“apparatus . . . meeting a general demand.” 265 Thus, as the Ninth Circuit
concluded in Barden, the provision of a public sidewalk system can
reasonably be understood to constitute a “service” under Title II. 266
Importantly, the canons of statutory construction also provide that a word
should not be interpreted in isolation, but in light of the structure and
purpose of the statute. 267 The structure of Title II supports a broad reading
of the term “services.” While Congress provided detailed, explicit
definitions for some Title II’s terms—including “public entity,” “qualified
individual with a disability,” and “facility”—it did not place any such
constraints on the reading of the phrase “services, programs, or
activities.” 268 Furthermore, the term “service” is grouped with the similarly
general words “activity” and “program.” 269
A broad reading of Title II is further supported by the ADA’s legislative
history. Congress’s stated purpose in passing the ADA was “[t]o provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
Moreover,
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 270
Congress enacted the ADAAA with the express purpose of counteracting
the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of certain ADA terms, and
reiterating its intent to provide expansive coverage for individuals with
disabilities under the ADA. 271
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Title II was enacted against a
historical background of state discrimination in the provision of public
services. 272 The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA

262. See supra note 89; see also supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text.
263. See supra Part I.E.3; see also supra notes 170–75 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 230 and accompanying text. When not expressly defined in the
statute, statutory terms are given their “ordinary meaning.” See supra Part I.G.
265. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
267. See supra Part I.G.
268. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
269. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 190, at 7 n.2 (noting
that the dictionary definitions of the terms “program,” “activity,” and “service” “confirm
their breadth”). The dictionary definition of “activity” is “a natural or normal function.”
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 22 (1986). “Program” is defined as “a
schedule or system under which action may be taken towards a desired goal.” Id. at 1812.
270. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Part I.F.
272. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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reveals that Congress specifically recognized architectural barriers as a
pervasive form of discrimination against the handicapped. 273
Critically, legislative history of the ADA also indicates that Congress
specifically recognized the importance of accessible streets and walkways
in accomplishing the integrative goals of the ADA. In the House Report
accompanying the ADA, Congress expressly stated that public entities must
provide curb cuts, and noted that the “employment, transportation, and
public accommodation sections of [the ADA] would be meaningless if
people who use wheelchairs were not afforded the opportunity to travel on
and between the streets.” 274
The Rehabilitation Act definition of “programs and services” and a plain
reading of language of Title II support the conclusion that the statutory
phrase “services, programs, and activities” is unambiguously broad.275 In
light of the statutory text and the legislative history of Title II, it is clear that
Congress intended to provide for expansive coverage under Title II of the
ADA, and that sidewalks fall within the scope of Title II. 276
B. Public Sidewalks Constitute a Public Service Within the Meaning of the
Title II Regulations
As Part III.A argued, the statutory text of Title II is unambiguously
broad, and covers all activities of state and local governments, including the
provision and maintenance of a public sidewalk system. Because Title II
clearly encompasses the provision of public sidewalks, it is unnecessary to
consider the DOJ’s implementing regulations.277 As the Supreme Court
outlined in Chevron, once a court concludes that Congress has directly
addressed a specific issue, the court “must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress.” 278
Nevertheless, this section argues that even if the text of Title II were
considered ambiguous, the DOJ regulations plainly demonstrate that
sidewalks qualify as a public service within the meaning of Title II. 279 So
long as the DOJ regulations are unambiguous and “based on a permissible
construction of the statute,” they are entitled to deference under Chevron.280
The Title II regulations promulgated by the DOJ provide that “no
qualified individual with a disability shall, because a public entity’s
facilities are inaccessible to or unusable by individuals with disabilities, be
excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of the services,

273. See supra notes 60, 71 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 108.
275. See Part II.A; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 253, at 3, 5 (“By its plain terms, the
statute covers the sidewalks, curbs, and parking lots at issue in this case.”).
276. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
277. See supra Part I.G; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
278. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984);
see also supra Part I.G.
279. See infra notes 280–93 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
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programs, or activities of a public entity.” 281 While it is true, as the Fifth
Circuit recognizes, that the regulations differentiate between “services” and
“facilities,” it does not follow that the provision of certain facilities cannot
constitute a service. 282 Sidewalks, as infrastructure, constitute facilities.283
The DOJ regulations expressly define “facilities” to include “walks” and
“passageways,” as the Fifth Circuit noted in Frame. 284 However, while the
sidewalks themselves may be facilities, the provision and maintenance of a
public sidewalk system is a government service.285
Additionally, Title II and the DOJ’s implementing regulations not only
proscribe the exclusion of disabled individuals from government
“programs, services, or activities,” but also prohibit public entities from
denying disabled persons the benefit of those government functions. 286 In
supplying a system of sidewalks, a government entity performs a service,
the benefit of which is the ability to use city walkways to freely move about
a city. If sidewalks are inaccessible to, and unusable by, disabled persons,
those individuals are both “exclude[d] from participation in” the city’s
system of public walkways and “den[ied] the benefit of” a government
service.
Furthermore, the Title II regulations specifically contemplate Title II’s
application to public sidewalks. 287 Though the regulations do not expressly
state that sidewalks must be made accessible, section 35.151(e) provides
that all newly constructed or altered roads and walkways must contain curb
ramps. 288 This requirement, as the Ninth Circuit recognized in Barden,
“reveals a general concern for the accessibility of public sidewalks.”289
Moreover, because curb ramps “could not be covered [under the ADA]
unless the sidewalks themselves are covered,” the curb ramp requirement
serves as an acknowledgment that public sidewalks are covered under Title
II. 290
Under the Fifth Circuit’s reading of the Title II regulations, public
entities would only be obligated to modify sidewalks to the extent necessary
to provide access to other, “actual,” government services, such as
This interpretation overlooks the language of section
schools. 291
281. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 244, 251 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 251 and accompanying text; see also Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, supra note 190, at 8 (noting that “in other contexts, [the Supreme] Court
itself has recognized the provision of sidewalks as an archetypal ‘general government
service[]’” (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1947) (noting that
providing churches access to “such general government services as ordinary police and fire
protection, connections for sewage disposal, [and] public highways and sidewalks” does not
pose a problem under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment))).
286. See supra Part I.E.1–2.
287. See supra Part II.A.
288. See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
289. See Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002); see also
supra note 181 and accompanying text.
290. See Barden, 292 F.3d at 1077; see also supra note 186 and accompanying text.
291. See supra Part II.B.2.
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35.150(d)(2), which contemplates the accessibility of all public sidewalks,
not just those immediately adjacent to other government facilities. Though
section 35.150(d)(2), which requires public entities to implement transition
plans, prioritizes the installation of curb ramps in “walkways serving
entities covered by the Act, including State and local government offices
and facilities,” the regulation also requires that transition plans schedule
curb cuts for walkways serving “transportation, places of public
accommodation, and employers” as well as “walkways serving other
areas.” 292
The plain language of the DOJ regulations evidences the DOJ’s position
that public sidewalks are subject to the provisions of Title II. Because the
DOJ promulgated the Title II regulations pursuant to authority delegated to
it by Congress, the DOJ’s interpretation of Title II contained in those
regulations is entitled to Chevron deference. 293
C. The Department of Justice Considers Sidewalks Subject to the
Accessibility Requirements of the Title II Regulations
Part III.B argues that even if the language of Title II were deemed
ambiguous, the conclusion that public sidewalks fall within the scope of
Title II is still warranted because the Title II regulations unambiguously
reflect the DOJ’s position that public sidewalks are covered by Title II—
earning deference under Chevron. Consequently, it is unnecessary to turn
to the DOJ’s interpretation of the Title II regulations it promulgates.294
However, in the event the Title II regulations are considered ambiguous,
this Note argues that a broad interpretation of Title II is still proper because
the DOJ has taken the stance that public sidewalks are subject to the
accessibility requirements of the Title II regulations, and an agency’s
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation is afforded deference under
Auer.
In the amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court in Barden, the
Solicitor General outlined the DOJ’s position that public sidewalks fall
within the scope of Title II and the DOJ regulations. The Solicitor General
identified the Title II regulations as being “premised on the view that a
public sidewalk system is a covered service, program, or activity under
Title II.” 295 The DOJ reaffirmed this position in its amicus brief in support
of the plaintiff’s petition for rehearing en banc in Frame. 296 That
interpretation cannot be said to be “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with

292. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(d)(2) (2010 and Mar. 15, 2011 amendments); Barden, 292 F.3d
at 1077.
293. See supra Part I.G; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 253, at 6 (arguing that the DOJ’s
position that “maintenance of pedestrian walkways by public entities is a covered program”
under Title II is “entitled to substantial deference”).
294. See supra Part I.G.
295. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 190, at 6, 10–12.
296. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants’ Petition for
Rehearing En Banc, supra note 253, at 6.
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the regulation[s]” themselves, and therefore, as the Ninth Circuit concluded,
the DOJ’s interpretation is entitled to substantial deference under Auer. 297
D. Title II and its Implementing Regulations Do Not Require Cities To
Make Every Existing Sidewalk Accessible
Finally, it is worth noting the weakness of arguments suggesting that
subjecting public sidewalks to the accessibility requirements of Title II
would pose excessive financial and administrative burdens on cities. This
section asserts that the Title II regulations protect cities from unreasonable
costs by providing that public entities are not “necessarily require[d]” to
make every existing facility accessible, and are not required to take any
steps that would result “in undue financial and administrative burdens.” 298
A public entity does not have to make its entire existing sidewalk system
immediately accessible to the disabled to comply with Title II. While the
regulations require that all newly constructed or altered sidewalks are
readily accessible, existing sidewalks, like other existing facilities, are
subject to the more limited program access standard.299 Under the Title II
regulations, a public entity is not obligated to renovate every existing
stretch of sidewalk, but is only required to replace existing sidewalks to the
extent necessary to ensure that the public sidewalk system, when viewed in
its entirety, is readily accessible to and usable by individuals with
disabilities. 300
Furthermore, the legislative history of the ADA reveals that Congress
acknowledged the potential financial constraints on cities, and the Title II
regulations expressly state that a city’s obligation to make existing facilities
accessible is subject to an undue burden defense.301 A public entity is not
required to renovate its sidewalks if it can show that bringing its public
sidewalk system into compliance with Title II’s accessibility requirements
would result in “undue administrative or financial burdens.”302
Granted, “undue burden” is a demanding standard, and even minor fixes,
such as removing obstacles in sidewalks, will impose some cost on
cities. 303 However, as Congress noted in the House Report on the ADA,
the long-term societal benefits of the integration of people with disabilities
are worth the short-term financial and administrative burdens. 304
CONCLUSION
The ADA was enacted against a history of state discrimination in the
administration of public services. Many viewed the passage of the ADA as
a major civil rights victory, and a significant step towards the full
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

See Barden, 292 F.3d at 1077; see also supra Part II.A.
See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.E.2.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.E.2.
See supra notes 104, 208–12 and accompanying text.
See supra note 104.
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participation of disabled individuals in society. However, since the ADA’s
enactment, courts have struggled to discern exactly how far Congress
intended the protections of the ADA to reach.
One such source of contention has been the scope of Title II, and what
government functions fall within Title II’s nondiscrimination mandate. The
Ninth Circuit has endorsed a broad interpretation of the statutory text,
holding that public sidewalks constitute “programs, services, or activities”
within the meaning of Title II. The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, has interpreted
the statute more narrowly and determined that public sidewalks are not in
themselves “services” within the meaning Title II.
The statutory language, legislative history, implementing regulations, and
DOJ interpretation of Title II demonstrate that public sidewalks are in fact
subject to the accessibility requirements of Title II. The Fifth Circuit’s
holding in Frame would allow public entities to deny individuals with
disabilities access to public sidewalks that do not lead to some other
government service. Such a narrow interpretation of Title II contravenes
Congress’s stated goals of integration and participation. As Jacobus
tenBroek recognized at the beginning of the disability rights movement,
“[t]he right to live in the world,” includes the right to move within it.305
“Without that right, that policy, that world, it is no living.” 306

305. tenBroek, supra note 25, at 918.
306. Id.

